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SETTLING SIGNIFICANT CASES
Jeffrey R. Seul*
Abstract: Negotiation, mediation, and other consensus-based alternatives to litigation are
most often studied and defended in the context of ordinary disputes, in which liability and
distributive issues are contested, but the background norms that govern the outcome of a
lawsuit are not. Many consider adjudication to be the only acceptable process for addressing
"significant cases": disputes about abortion, school prayer, the environment, and other valueladen issues in which background norms are contested. I argue that this perspective is ironic
because litigation, like negotiation, entails compromise. Litigation is a lottery in which the
substantive values a party seeks to defend, and which it claims are absolute, may be wholly
or partially discredited by the court. Furthermore, litigation merely shifts the burden of
negotiation to judges. I distinguish two types of negotiation, bargaining and moral
deliberation, and argue that both should be viewed as legitimate alternatives to litigation for
processing disputes involving deep moral disagreement. Deliberative dispute resolution
processes present important opportunities for democratic participation, and settlements
resulting from them may benefit both the parties and society in ways that litigation cannot.
Even where parties are incapable of engaging in genuine moral deliberation, however,
settlement for strategic reasons sometimes may be a sensible alternative for parties to a
significant case, and should not invite scorn. Litigation and negotiation are complementary,
mutually reinforcing social processes, and each has a legitimate role to play in our nation's
moral discourse and the evolution of social norms.
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INTRODUCTION
Relatively few litigants attempt to obtain a hearing before the United
States Supreme Court. Parties engaged in run-of-the-mill litigation may
feel they have been wronged and that justice must be done, but most
cases settle without a hearing on the merits.1 Legal disputes that have the
potential to create new law on important public policy matters-one
class of what Owen Fiss dubbed "significant cases" in his oft-cited
polemic Against Settlemen?-are, however, different. When a dispute is
about abortion, affirmative action, religion, use or preservation of the
natural environment, gun control, controversial medical technologies
like stem cell research, or other issues involving deep value differences,
settlement is rare, and talk about the possibility of settlement may seem
naive or even reckless to some.
Consider the following example. A Colorado statute establishes an
eight-foot floating buffer zone around persons entering and leaving
1. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming Nov. 2004) (charting a
precipitous decline in the number of federal and state civil and criminal trials over recent decades,
despite increases in the number of case filings, lawyers, and judges).
2. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087 (1984). According to Fiss,
"significant cases" mark "the real divide" between proponents and opponents of settlement. See id.
He challenged negotiation proponents to "speak to these more 'significant' cases, and demonstrate
the propriety of settling them." Id.

Settling Significant Cases
health care facilities. 3 Within a 100-foot radius of any entrance to a
hospital or clinic, those wishing to influence women seeking abortionswhether through picketing, spoken protest, distribution of literature, or
otherwise-are prohibited from coming within eight feet of a woman
without her consent.4 The statute was challenged by abortion opponents
through litigation that reached the U.S. Supreme Court.5 After five years
of protracted litigation, the Court ultimately upheld the statute.6
It is not difficult to imagine ways this case could have been settled at
an earlier stage, and on terms that at least partially respected the parties'
respective values and objectives, whatever one may think of the options
and the likelihood of achieving them. For example, groups opposing
abortion could have agreed not to protest outside health care facilities or
to limit their protest activities in specified ways if the health care
facilities agreed to provide women considering an abortion with
literature that presents cautionary, or even openly critical, perspectives
of abortion. Or, perhaps the parties could have jointly produced a video
designed to inform women (and men) considering an abortion about the
full range of perspectives on the social, moral, religious, and healthrelated issues attending their decision, and about the various forms of
public and private support available to those who make one choice or the
other. Perhaps the parties could have agreed to a program of optional
counseling for women interested in meeting, separately or together, with
counselors on both sides of the debate. Perhaps one of these suggestions
could have been combined with a 24-hour pre-abortion waiting period
requirement.'
Regardless of one's views on abortion, settlement of a case like this
may seem improbable at best. Settlement terms like those outlined above
also may seem odd to some--out of touch with parties' respective selfunderstandings and values and the divergent meanings they attach to
abortion and the buffer zone statute. Settlement on these or any other

3. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
4. Id.
5. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000).
6. Id. at 734-35.
7. In fact, such programs already have been implemented through legislation in many other states.
See Kate Zernike, 30 Years After Abortion Ruling, New Trends but the Old Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 2003, at Al (surveying federal and state abortion laws). Twenty-five states have a
mandatory counseling requirement, mandatory waiting period, or both. Id. at A16. The U.S.
Supreme Court has sanctioned pre-abortion waiting period requirements, provided they are not
unduly burdensome. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992).
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grounds would smack of the worst sort of moral relativism to others.
Even those for whom these or other settlement possibilities have some
practical appeal may fear that the judiciary's role in the production of
norms regarding divisive social issues could be undermined by attempts
to settle such significant cases. 8
In this Article, I argue that negotiation-including its facilitated
variants, such as mediation and consensus-building processes-should
be viewed as a legitimate alternative to litigation for addressing disputes
involving deep moral disagreements. Fiss and a small cadre of other
critics of alternatives to litigation are particularly opposed to settlement
of these significant cases. 9 With the exception of Carrie MenkelMeadow' 0 and a small handful of others," however, few legal scholars
8. This is one of Fiss's key objections to settlement of significant cases. Fiss, supra note 2, at
1087.
9. In addition to Fiss, the more notable detractors of settlement include Richard Delgado, Trina
Grillo, Laura Nader, Judith Resnick, Stephen Yeazell, and, at least in his earlier writings on the
subject, David Luban. See generally Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing
the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359 (arguing that
members of minority groups are disadvantaged in mediation); Trina Grillo, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) (arguing that mediation
disadvantages women); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO.
L.J. 2619 (1995) (arguing that settlement deprives the public of legal norms and that settlements are
less just than litigated outcomes) [hereinafter Erosion]; Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the
Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1993) (arguing that Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
proponents value harmony over justice); Judith Resnick, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986) (criticizing trend toward promotion of settlement in Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil
Process, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 631 (arguing that changes in civil process, including increased
promotion of alternatives to litigation, have weakened the justice system by removing cases from
appellate scrutiny).
10. Through a series of articles, Menkel-Meadow, one of settlement's most prolific and
jurisprudentially inclined proponents, progressively develops the most robust argument for
settlement of significant cases that has been offered to date. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For
and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 485, 500-01 (1985) (arguing that it can be hard to distinguish "private" from "public" oriented
disputes and that parties to important public disputes may often achieve a higher quality of justice
through settlement than they could through litigation); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as
Consensus Builder: Ethicsfor a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63 (2002) (examining new roles
for lawyers as neutral third parties who can assist in the resolution of all types of disputes, including
those involving significant public policy issues); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Practicing "In the
Interests of Justice " in the Twenty-First Century: PursuingPeace as Justice 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
1761, 1763 (2002) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, PursuingPeace](arguing that lawyers and parties
can serve their interests by "searching for consensus solutions to seemingly intractable public policy
and legal disputes"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure ofProblem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 835-36 (1984) (arguing that "cases where the
law must be clear, and in abortion, school busing, etc." are "appropriately settled by total victory,"
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but that some of these disputes "may still benefit from a problem-solving conception both before
and after the decree"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 35 (1996) [hereinafter MenkelMeadow, Trouble] (suggesting that consensus-oriented approaches to dispute resolution can be used
effectively "for policy deliberations"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Litigation Is Not the Only
Way: Consensus Building and Mediation as Public Interest Lawyering, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y.
37, 39 (2002) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Litigation] (exploring "how processes that enable the
expression and 'handling' of conflict may serve the public interest as well as, if not better than, the
simplistic Anglo-American conception of adversary justice or public interest litigation"); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is it Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of
Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2676 (1995) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Whose
Dispute?] (arguing that settlement can be seen as a form of "democratic expression" that enables
parties to obtain more individualized forms of justice and even to "explore avenues for law
reform"). Menkel-Meadow does not draw a tight distinction between ordinary and significant cases
as I have defined them, no doubt in part because she believes that what I call ordinary cases
sometimes present significant policy issues. See Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute? at 2667 n.24 ("It
is not only our larger 'structural' lawsuits that raise important issues of public values, but even the
'smallest' of cases has significant public, as well as private, possibilities of value clarification.").
Her belief in the potential public significance of seemingly ordinary cases is a byproduct of her
experience mediating automobile accident cases, in which "multicultural/racial issues" and
questions regarding "standards of human behavior and responsibility" often surfaced. Id. In her
most recent work, however, Menkel-Meadow focuses on settlement of what I refer to as significant
cases more explicitly than she does in most of her earlier work. This suggests her acknowledgment
that some cases present exceptional public policy issues and that her general defense of consensual
dispute resolution processes applies to these cases with equal force. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow,
Pursuing Peace at 1763 (advocating the search "for consensus solutions to seemingly intractable
public policy and legal disputes").
I1. Several other legal scholars, practicing lawyers, and mediators have also offered explicit
justifications for settling significant cases. See, e.g., Margaret G. Farrell, Revisiting Roe v. Wade:
Substance and Process in the Abortion Debate, 68 IND. L.J. 269, 330-60 (1993) (discussing
potential benefits of consensus-oriented, "participatory adjudication" model for resolving the issues
presented by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Barbara Ashley Phillips & Anthony C. Piazza,
The Role of Mediation in Public Interest Disputes, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1231, 1236-44 (1983)
(advocating the use of mediation in policy disputes); Riley M. Sinder et al., Promoting Progress:
The Supreme Court'sDuty of Care, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 71, 122-32 (1996) (arguing that the U.S.
Supreme Court should exercise its authority in a manner that does not dictate solutions to social
problems, but which encourages the development of consensus solutions to them). Earlier strains of
legal scholarship that are not focused specifically on settlement of the types of significant cases I
address-particularly the work of "legal process" scholars-also lend support to the notion of
settling value-laden disputes. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 645 (William Eskridge &
Phillip Frickey eds., 1994) (encouraging use of negotiation and mediation for "disputes which are
not susceptible of solution by reasoning from generally applicable criteria of decision"); Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1298-1302 (1976)
(discussing the changing role of courts in institutional reform, including their role in helping parties
fashion negotiated remedies, often with the help of third parties functioning as mediators); Lon
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 395 (1978) (arguing that
adjudication is ill-suited to the resolution of disputes involving "polycentric" problems, in which the
parties' relationships have many, interrelated strands); Lon Fuller, Mediation-Its Form and
Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971) [hereinafter Fuller, Mediation] (describing the
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of negotiation and alternative dispute resolution have openly supported
the prospect of settling significant cases. 12 To date, most settlement
proponents have focused primarily on what one might call ordinary
cases: disputes that typically occur against a background of relatively
well-settled legal norms that are widely considered to be morally
legitimate.
I believe negotiation should be viewed as a credible alternative to
litigation for resolving disputes that raise important public policy
questions. As explained more fully below, I use the term "negotiation"
in two senses. The first is "strategic settlement": pure, self-interested
bargaining in which each party is willing to satisfy others' interests
solely as a strategy for satisfying its own interests. The second is
collective moral deliberation, in which parties explicitly seek mutually
recognizable moral grounds on which to justify the terms of their
agreement. When moral deliberation produces a formal or informal
agreement among the parties, the agreement necessarily results from
some degree of change regarding one's own perspective, others'
perspectives, or both. Although I do not suggest that we should actively
encourage crass bargaining as the best approach for resolving disputes

"central quality of mediation" as "its capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not by
imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their
relationship").
12. On the other hand, few legal scholars of negotiation and dispute resolution have openly
opposed the idea. Robert Mnookin, Scott Peppet, and Andrew Tulumello advise that "some cases
shouldn't settle," including cases in which "a party has a strong desire to create a lasting legal
precedent" and those in which "a party's interest in public vindication is so strong that it cannot be
met without adjudication." ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 107 (2000) (emphasis in original). This prescription
seems to be offered as a reminder to the parties themselves that litigation is the only means of
obtaining a judicial precedent and (in their view) the most visible means of obtaining public
vindication, rather than as a general critique of settlement of significant cases. See id.; see also
Robert H. Mnookin, When Not to Negotiate: A Negotiation Imperialist Reflects on Appropriate
Limits, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1077, 1082-90 (2003) (proposing a framework for deciding whether to
negotiate in situations that raise questions regarding the appropriateness and effectiveness of
negotiation). Alternative dispute resolution proponents Frank E. A. Sander and Stephen B. Goldberg
suggest that, from the public's perspective, "a court resolution might be preferable to a private
settlement" of a case involving a significant policy question, such as a dispute that "raises a
significant question of statutory or constitutional interpretation." Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B.
Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure,
10 NEGOTIATION J. 49, 60 (1994). For this reason, they argue that courts should not necessarily
"encourage or assist settlement in such a case." Id. But see WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING
DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 17 (1988) ("In at least
some cases ...rights-based court procedures are preferable, from a societal perspective, to
resolution through interests-based negotiation.").

Settling Significant Cases
involving deeply held values, I argue that both types of negotiation can
play a legitimate role in the management and the eventual, just
resolution of these disputes in various circumstances and make valuable
contributions to democracy.
Litigation of a dispute involving deep moral disagreement has costs as
well as benefits, from the perspectives of both the parties and the public.
Negotiation also has costs and benefits. Even in the realm of significant
cases, litigation's ultimate value-to the parties and to society as a
whole-can be assessed only by comparing litigation to other available
means of responding to the dispute. 13 The comparative costs and benefits
of litigation versus settlement have been explored extensively with4
respect to the everyday types of disputes that crowd court dockets.'
Legal scholars have said less about the relative benefits of litigation and
negotiation with respect to significant cases.
In Part I of this Article, I examine some key differences between
ordinary and significant cases-differences that may make settlement of
significant cases seem inappropriate or implausible to some. In Part II, I
discuss two ironies that are little acknowledged and discussed, but are
implicit in resistance to the idea of settling significant cases. In Part III, I
respond to claims that it is impossible to settle significant cases because
of the intractable nature of disputes involving deeply held values. In Part
IV, I consider what litigants and the public stand to gain, and lose, when
cases that present significant public policy questions are settled. I
13. See Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 102, 10405 (1986) (noting that litigation and settlement each have costs and benefits); Fuller, Mediation,
supra note 11, at 307 (arguing that we must develop the ability "to appraise the relative aptness, for
solving a given problem, of the various competing forms of social ordering"); Menkel-Meadow,
Pursuing Peace, supra note 10, at 1770 ("Claims about the fairness and 'justice' of all forms of
process must be considered both for what they promise and do internally, as well as in relation to
what else is available."); Sander & Goldberg, supra note 12, at 60 (discussing advantages and
disadvantages of various alternatives to litigation).
14. Much of this analysis has been done from a law and economics perspective. See generally
Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067 (1989); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J.

LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement of Litigation, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 442-51 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); William
M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to Legal Procedureand JudicialAdministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973);
George L. Priest, Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation: An Economic Analysis, I Sup.

CT. ECON. REv. 163 (1982); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical
Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55
(1982).
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explore the relationship between settlement and deliberative democratic
theory in Part V, arguing that settlement processes that invite collective
moral deliberation can be an important form of democratic participation.
In Part VI, I anticipate and respond to claims that my perspective
represents a form of moral relativism. I also present a set of principles
for designing consensual dispute resolution processes geared toward
resolving disputes involving deep value differences. Fidelity to these
principles, I argue, increases the likelihood that the outcomes of such
processes will be morally sound, socially desirable, and durable.
I.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ORDINARY AND SIGNIFICANT
CASES

As indicated above, the types of cases I refer to as "ordinary cases"
typically involve disputes that occur against a background of relatively
well-settled legal norms that the parties accept as legitimate. For
example, in a typical contract action, the parties do not question whether
the plaintiff is entitled to damages if the defendant breached a contract
with the plaintiff. They disagree about whether the defendant breached
and, if the judge or jury concludes that it did, the amount of damages to
which the plaintiff is entitled. Similarly, in the typical tort action, the
parties dispute whether the defendant caused the plaintiffs injuries and,
if so, how much compensation is appropriate. They do not question
whether a party responsible for another's injuries is liable to the injured
party.
Significant cases are different. They involve contested social norms,
and the competing norms defended by the parties often are foundational
to their respective worldviews.1 5 Fiss identifies four types of significant
cases:
cases in which there are significant distributional inequalities;
those in which it is difficult to generate authoritative consent
because organizations or social groups are parties or because the
power to settle is vested in autonomous agents; those in which the
court must continue to supervise the parties after judgment; and
those in which justice needs to be done, or to put it more
modestly, where there is a genuine social need for an authoritative
15. See Theodore M. Benditt, Compromising Interests and Principles, in COMPROMISE IN

ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS 26, 32 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979)
(distinguishing between disputes about ideals and disputes about interests). For a general taxonomy
of dispute types, see generally GEORG SIMMEL, CONFLICT (Kurt H. Wolff trans., 1955).

Settling Significant Cases
16

interpretation of law.
I give some attention to cases that exhibit the first three of these
characteristics, but I focus on the final type of case for two reasons.
First, I believe cases likely to produce an authoritative interpretation of
law often (though, obviously, not always) also fall into one or more of
the other categories. For instance, the early school desegregation and
busing cases exhibited all four characteristics to some degree, but the
fourth characteristic arguably is what made them most socially,
politically, legally, and morally significant.17 Second, I consider Fiss's
and others' objections to settlement to be most compelling with respect
to the fourth type of case, and less has been offered by way of rebuttal to
these objections.
Significant cases either present novel legal issues or, much to the
contrary, arise against a well-settled background of legal norms that a
segment of the population considers to be out-of-step with contemporary
(or at least their preferred) social norms. In the first instance,
background legal norms are extremely thin or nonexistent. Because the
parties are not "bargaining in the shadow of the law" in any meaningful
sense, it would be very difficult for them to resolve their dispute
consensually based upon convergent expectations about how a court
would resolve it.18 The most reliable type of information-a prior

decision that addresses the disputed issues-is simply unavailable. A

16. Fiss,supra note 2, at 1087.
17. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979) (arguing that disputants' relative substantive and
procedural rights influence negotiation behavior and outcomes). But see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 40-81 (1991) (reporting results of
empirical study of animal trespass and boundary fence dispute settlements among farmers and
ranchers in Shasta County, California, in which parties based settlements on informal norms rather
than relevant legal principles, of which they were generally unaware); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 125-26 (1991) (reporting results of
empirical studies which, among other things, indicate that most people are unaware of decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court); Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 505-68 (1991) (reporting results of empirical study
of securities fraud settlements in which settlement amounts bore little or no relation to expected
value of trial outcomes). While the average citizen may be unaware of decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court that affect their interests, representatives of social groups that typically influence or
control litigation of significant cases (e.g., activists and public interest lawyers) no doubt are aware
of them. Interestingly, Ian Ayres and Eric Talley argue that uncertain legal norms actually may
create incentives that promote equitable agreements. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic
Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1102
(1995).
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notable example of the second type of case-one where existing law was
challenged and unsettled as a result of a shift in prevailing social
norms-is Brown v. Board of Education.1 9 Brown I upended
segregationist legal norms established, legitimated and protected by
Plessy v. Ferguson20 and a series of prior U.S. Supreme Court
decisions. 1 In this second type of significant case, a prior decision
addressing the disputed issues exists, but one party opposes it and is
hopeful that it can persuade the Court to alter or reverse the decision.
As Paul Campos explains, significant cases are difficult to resolve
through the type of rational argumentation and decision-making that
occurs when fundamental principles are not at stake and generally
22
accepted legal norms make the outcome of litigation more predictable.
[M]ost difficult legal problems involve not only complicated
empirical problems, but also problematic judgments concerning
questions of moral value, and (often as a direct consequence of
these other difficulties) various conceptually incommensurable
definitions of what sorts of facts are said to constitute legal
meaning. These latter types of disputes will tend not to be
amenable to resolution through the procurement of more
evidence via the workings of the dispute processing system,
either because they involve conceptual disagreements about
what should even count as evidence, or because they can't
usefully be thought of as involving evidentiary questions at all.23
One might say that ordinary cases involve questions of justice with a
small "j," whereas significant cases involve questions of Justice writ
large. In significant cases, the parties are trying to establish or buttress
background legal norms, either by creating a new legal norm where none
presently exists, or by subverting or reaffirming an existing legal norm
that mirrors a favored social norm. Each party is pursuing justice in the
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I].
20. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21. See generally CHARLES
INTERPRETATION (1987).

A.

LOFGREN,

THE

PLESSY

CASE:

A

LEGAL-HISTORICAL

22. PAUL F. CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERICAN LAW 63 (1998); see also
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) 42-43 (1997) (arguing that
parties are incapable of reaching consensus in ideological disputes).
23. CAMPOS, supra note 22, at 63. As Campos explains, "within such a zone powerful competing
considerations can be adduced for holding a variety of views. Furthermore such considerations can't
be refuted without recourse to some axiomatic ground of argument that others do not accept and
that, precisely because it is axiomatic, cannot be argued for rationally." Id. at 160 (emphasis in
original).
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larger sense of a legal order that affirms a social order one considers
normative. The parties are pursuing their respective universalizing
projects by attempting, through adjudication, to establish, alter or defend
a legal rule.24
When we litigate significant cases, we do so-and say we do so-to
advance or defend a claimed right or state of affairs that we believe
follows axiomatically from a deeply held value, such as the sanctity of
life, personal freedom, or equality.25 Though this point is obvious
enough, here is a small sampling of quotes that illustrate it:
On abortion:
"[I]f you step back and consider this, that the richest people that
have ever lived on the face of this earth have somehow engaged
in killing one of every three of their own offspring, you have to
think something is bad, bad wrong there. 26
"It really comes down to whether women will have an equal
that we
place at life's table, whether we value children enough
27
want them to be planned and wanted and cared for.",
On the Boy Scouts' exclusion of homosexuals:
"The Boy Scouts of America, as a private organization, must
have the right to establish its own standardsof membership if it
is to continue to instill the values of the Scout Oath and Law in
boys. 28
"The

dissents

strongly

embrace

understanding of gay equality ...

a

sensitive

and

fair

and clearly have the better of

24. See KENNEDY, supra note 22, at 39-70 (discussing adjudication in terms of ideological

conflict over legal rules).
25. See Benditt, supra note 15, at 34 (noting that disputants' favored policies flow from their
moral convictions).
26. Zurnike, supra note 7, at A16 (quoting David O'Steen, executive director, National Right to
Life Committee) (emphasis added).
27. Id. (quoting Gloria Feldt, president, Planned Parenthood) (emphasis added).
28. News Release, Boy Scouts of America (June 28, 2000) (commenting on the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.scouting.org (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
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In the eyes of these disputants, social justice will not exist on a grand
scale unless a cherished value is actualized through enforcement of a
claimed right or the institution or eradication of a particular state of
social affairs. Parties to significant cases seek to establish or defend
structures they consider essential to a just social order.
Deeply held values are among the raw material from which an
individual's sense of self and the identity of significant social groups to
which one belongs are constructed.3 ° Significant cases often pit one
moral community and at least one of its identity-defining norms against
other communities and at least one of their respective, identity-defining
norms. For example, in the anti-segregation phase of the civil rights
struggle, African-Americans and other anti-segregationists opposed
segregation laws and policies based on their commitment to the dignity
and equality of African-Americans, and segregationists attempted to
preserve those same laws and policies, at least in part, on the basis of
their commitment to notions of federalism. 31 The values and norms at
stake in significant cases also partially define social boundaries and
generate and maintain social structures and institutions in which
individual and group identities and perceptions of self-interest are
constructed.32
It is not merely the subject matter of the dispute that gives rise to a
significant case. Some disputes about school prayer generate significant
cases, and others do not. The parents of students attending a private,
Christian school might agree that their children should pray together, but
they may disagree about how frequently the students should pray. Nor
are significant cases necessarily a byproduct of disputes between
members of social groups whose boundaries are partially defined by
29. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Cases: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (Sept. !,
2000) (emphasis added), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
30. Support for this proposition is readily found within the literature on social psychology. See,
e.g., Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni et al., Barriers to Resolution in Ideologically Based Negotiations:
The Role of Values and Institutions, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 41, 44-45 (2002) (discussing the
relationship between values and individual and group identity); see also Benditt, supra note 15, at
31 (arguing, from a philosophical perspective, that "our principles often define us, at least in part").
31. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243-44 (1964)
(concerning states' rights defense of white-only accommodations).
32. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 8
(1983) ("Men and women take on concrete identities because of the way they conceive and create,
and then possess and employ social goods."); Wade-Benzoni, supranote 30, at 43-47.
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divergent, deeply held values. A simple contract dispute between a gun
control advocate and a member of the National Rifle Association is
unlikely to produce a significant case. These examples raise distributive
questions that are comparatively easy to resolve, because the parties'
disagreement arises against a background of mutually accepted social or
legal norms.

II.

TWO IRONIES OF LITIGATION

The ardor with which significant cases are litigated is understandable
in light of the depth of the litigants' respective commitments to the
values they seek to advance or defend, but two characteristics of
adjudication as a process for achieving one's objectives also make it
somewhat ironic. Litigation is a lottery in which the substantive values a
party seeks to defend, and which it claims are absolute, may be wholly
or partially discredited by the court. Furthermore, litigation merely shifts
the burden of negotiation to judges. In both of these ways, litigation, like
negotiation, entails compromise.
A.

Risking It All

Litigation always involves risk of an unfavorable ruling. It frequently
produces binary, win-lose outcomes. When it does not, both parties lose
to some extent.33 As Martin Shapiro explains, "lurking within such
judicial institutions as money damages and equitable discretion are
major elements of compromise. 34 Compromise is built into the
system-not negotiated compromise, but compromise in the sense of
choosing to forgo alternatives and accept the risk that courts will endorse
a norm that is not wholly consistent with one's perspective. 35
33. Judith Resnick, a prominent critic of alternative dispute resolution, observes that judicial
decisions often are more complex than some negotiation proponents suggest. Resnick, supra note 9,
at 537 n.205. Interestingly, some critics of settlement miss this point. Jules Coleman and Charles
Silver, for example, argues that settlements, unlike judgments, almost never do justice because
neither party prevails completely over the other. Coleman & Silver, supra note 13, at 104.
34. Martin Shapiro, Compromise and Litigation, in COMPROMISE INETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS
163, 173-74 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979). Shapiro associates winner-takeall outcomes primarily with suits at law, where the remedy is money damages, and more integrative
outcomes (i.e., a balance of the equities) with suits at equity. Id. at 167-68. He cites the school
desegregation cases as the prime example of the latter. Id. at 170.
35. See Arthur Kuflik, Morality and Compromise, in COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW, AND
POLITICS 38, 40 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979) ("[T]he mere fact that the
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Most disputants who litigate a significant case undoubtedly are
painfully aware that the outcome of their lawsuit may be an unfavorable
legal precedent, as Jules Lobel explains. 36 Lobel, a law professor who
litigated and lost many significant cases opposing the United States'
interventions in Central America during the 1980s, still questions his
efforts, even as he defends them.37 Lobel ultimately concludes that
litigation is an acceptable strategy for pursing social change because it
catalyzes political engagement and influences public discourse,
contributing to the creation of a "culture of legal struggle that
continually informs and inspires future generations to challenge
oppressive practices. 38
Whether or not one accepts Lobel's vision of justice as endless
struggle, one can appreciate litigation's potential value in rallying others,
including future generations, around one's cause. As Lobel
acknowledges, however, it is not the only potential way to mobilize
others. Given litigation's high costs, it seems odd that he makes "no
special claim for ... [its] strategic usefulness ... as compared with other
forms of political and social action., 39 Short of life-threatening forms of
protest (e.g., hunger strikes) and acts of civil disobedience involving risk
of physical retaliation or imprisonment, litigating a case all the way to
the Supreme Court in an unfavorable social and political climate surely
is one of the most costly signals of the strength of one's convictions and
one of the riskiest approaches for achieving one's ultimate ends.
Nonetheless, Lobel encourages lawyer-activists to "reject.. . the
solution of minor improvement in favor of total redemption., 40 By doing
so, they accept that their efforts may not improve, and perhaps may

contending parties have agreed to submit their dispute to the determination of a certain procedure
will be sufficient to ascribe a compromise to them, however they fare in the end."); id. at 53 (stating
that litigants "affirm that they are prepared to make concessions to one another if, in the considered
judgment of a competent judge, that is what they ought to do") (emphasis in original); David Luban,
The Quality of Justice, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 381, 389 (1989) [hereinafter Quality] (noting that a
"trial is in effect a lottery"); Shapiro, supra note 34, at 168-69 (arguing that, even in suits at law
that produce winner-take-all outcomes, parties compromise by agreeing to abide by the court's
decision).
36. Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets:Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331, 1336
(1995).
37. Id. at 1337.
38. Id. at 1353.
39. Id. at 1355.
40. Id. at 1338.
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worsen, the lot of those they represent. 41 Things may get worse, or stay
bad much longer, before they get better.42
The losers will likely view their loss as a temporary setback or, like
Lobel, a marginal gain in light of the perceived benefits realized in terms
of promoting one's cause. Yet, legal norms articulated by courts often
further entrench social norms that the losers opposed. As Riley Sinder
44
3
and colleagues argue, until Brown 4 overturned Plessy v. Ferguson,
"segregationists could use federal and state governments to block
problem-solvers from providing adequate education for blacks. 4 5
Whether the costs of unsuccessful litigation are ultimately justified is a
41. It is interesting to note that many of the lawyers litigating significant cases are not among the
class of persons they seek to protect. For example, Lobel, a citizen and resident of the United States,
sought to protect Central Americans through litigation in U.S. courts. Id. at 1333-34. Albion
Tourge&, who represented the losing parties in Plessy v. Ferguson, was white. (For an account of
Tourge6's life and legal work, see generally OTTO H. OLSEN, CARPETBAGGER'S CRUSADE: THE
LIFE OF ALBION WINEGAR TOURGEE (1965)). Lobel's heavy focus on the lawyer's motivations and
justifications for litigating, as well as his many florid references to activist litigators as "prophets,"
visionary "fools," "artists," "poets," and the like, arguably gives the lawyers' narratives and
professional identities precedence over the developing narratives, and practical circumstances, of
those they represent. Lobel, supra note 36, at 1331, 1341. To borrow a phrase from MenkelMeadow, one cannot help but ask, "[w]hose dispute is it anyway?" Menkel-Meadow, Whose
Dispute?, supra note 10, at 2663. 1wonder whether those whose interests Lobel and his colleagues
represented fully appreciated the negative consequences of litigation pursued and lost, as compared
to other forms of political engagement. See also Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976)
(questioning whether civil rights lawyers' pursuit of their own litigation goals compromised their
clients' educational goals); Farrell, supra note 11,at 334 ("Ideologically motivated attorneys, many
of whom work with organizations with predetermined litigation programs, may consciously or
unconsciously subordinate the interests of class members or subgroups of class members to their
political agendas."). As long as there are disagreements on matters involving deeply held values, the
pursuit of opposing views of justice will indeed produce social struggle, but many lawyers may be
too quick to file a complaint and too convinced of the necessity and inevitability of litigation to final
judgment. As Lobel himself argues, "in a nation like ours, where the idea of justice historically has
been attached to courts and judicial proceedings, it is inevitable that lawyers who are connected
with radical social movements will introduce their struggles into the judicial arena even when they
recognize that their chances of success are small." Lobel, supra note 36, at 1355.
42. Jack Greenberg, former director-counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (and another
white civil rights litigator), advises against such high-stakes litigation when social and political
conditions make a favorable ruling very unlikely. Jack Greenberg, Litigationfor Social Change:
Methods, Limits and Role in Democracy, 29 REC. ASS'N BAR CITY N.Y. 320, 349 (1974) ("Lawyers
ought to try to avoid creating a new Plessy v. Ferguson and should apply energies where they will
be most productive.").
43. Brown 1, 347 US 483, 495 (1954) (overturning "separate but equal" doctrine in public
education).
44. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (holding that Louisiana statute requiring
separate but equal railway accommodations for white and colored persons was not unconstitutional).
45. Sinder, supra note 11, at 102.
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complex (and perhaps unanswerable) question,
as Lobel suggests, but
46
there can be no doubt that there are costs.
B.

Letting Others Negotiatefor Us

Litigating a significant case to final judgment is ironic in another
sense. Those who litigate let others negotiate for them. Though their
most cherished values are at stake, the litigants in a significant case
relinquish control of its resolution to a small group of strangers. These
strangers have authority to leave the litigants' concerns unsatisfied or to
produce a "balanced" outcome that is different than the balance the
litigants, who have greater knowledge of their own interests, preferences
and moral convictions, might otherwise strike for themselves. In effect,
they let judges and juries do their compromising for them-in this case,
compromise in the sense of a negotiated resolution of the dispute.
Others negotiate for us at all levels within the judicial system. Jury
deliberations determine the outcome of many trials, but even bench trials
are resolved by negotiation in the sense that trial court judges render
their decisions through a conversation with other judges that occurs
through published opinions which address the same or analogous issues.
Panels of judges decide appeals. I focus on the U.S. Supreme Court in
the remainder of this Part because it is the "negotiation delegate" of last
resort in any significant case. 47
Although negotiation among the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court is
highly stylized, there is no question that they negotiate. They do not
engage in the type of coarse horse-trading that sometimes occurs within
the other branches of government; rather, they "accommodate" their own
ideological perspectives to others' perspectives as necessary to
substantially achieve their own objectives. 48 The author of an opinion
46. Some have argued that the cost of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the Dred Scott case
was no less than all the lives lost in the Civil War. See, e.g., EDGAR BODENHEIMER,
JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW 371-72 (1962) (stating that the Civil
War might have been avoided if the Court's decision had in some way acknowledged the depth of
antislavery sentiment in parts of the country); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE
COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 98 (1985) (stating
that the Court's decision "made the Civil War all but inevitable").
47. U.S. CONST. art. Ill § I.

48. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETrlNG IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 144-45 (1991). Although the focus of Perry's study is the Court's decisionmaking behavior on petitions for certiorari, he frequently compares the Court's behavior at the
certiorari stage to its decision-making behavior on the merits of a case. See generally id. Of course,
a U.S. Supreme Court justice's votes naturally reflect his or her "attitudes, values, or personal policy
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may circulate many drafts in an effort to produce a majority, sometimes
engaging in strategic behavior such as exposing less than the full court to
a particular draft in an interim effort to address the requirements of a
particular justice or group of justices. 49 Because a single justice cannot
dictate the Court's decision, most decisions are the product of some
degree of compromise among those in the majority. Through discussion
and successive draft opinions, justices tinker their way toward a
conclusion that produces an outcome and supporting rationale with
which each member of the majority is, by definition, at least minimally
satisfied.5 °
As a result of these efforts to accommodate the perspectives of other
members of the Court, many judicially created norms represent an
amalgam of reasons and values. 5' The U.S. Supreme Court's holding in
53
Roe v. Wade 52 is one notable example of such a compromise result.
The litigants themselves might have reached this compromise if they had
attempted to author a draft bill on the issue and lobbied for its passage.
Pro-life activists surely do not consider the Court's holding to be a "winwin" outcome, but at least some of them would admit that the Court
attempted to balance respect for a pregnant woman's autonomy and
respect for the developing human fetus.
Unanimous decisions frequently involve a high degree of mutual
accommodation.5 4 The following quote from an unidentified justice,
recorded by H.W. Perry, Jr. during his study of the U.S. Supreme
Court's behavior when considering petitions for certiorari, illustrates the
preferences." Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. Sc1. REv. 557, 557 (1989) (reporting results of empirical analysis

demonstrating correlation between U.S. Supreme Court justices' personal ideological beliefs as
expressed in personal writing, speeches, and positions taken in the Court's opinions).
49. See PERRY, supra note 48, at 144-45.
50. See id. at 195 ("[J]ustices... [bargain] when it comes to the reasoning in an opinion, if not
the judgment. We know that bargaining (or accommodation) takes place at that stage.").
51. See generally Aleksander Peczenk, Cumulation and Compromises of Reasons in the Law, in
COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS 176 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,

1979) (arguing that compromise and aggregation of reasons is much more common in the creation
of legal norms than mutually exclusive choices among them).
52. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
53. Id. at 164-65 (recognizing a woman's right to have an abortion prior to the point at which the
fetus would be independently viable, and a state's right to proscribe abortion thereafter, except
when abortion is necessary to protect the mother's life or health).
54. See PERRY, supra note 48, at 148; cf SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW:
REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 121 (2003) ("We should never lose sight of how

regrettable it is when the Court cannot find its way to agreement.").

Washington Law Review

Vol. 79:881, 2004

point:
Chief Justice Warren was credited a lot for having a unanimous
Court in Brown. The cost was having "all deliberate speed" come
in. I think it would have been better to have the dissent spelled
out... have the dissenters tell their problems, and then have a
strong opinion answer the dissent rather than coming down with a
weak opinion so that everyone would sign. I think it is better to
acknowledge what argument there is on a controversial issue like
that.55
As this remark makes clear, the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court not
only negotiate, they sometimes join opinions that seem incrementalist to
some signatories and too progressive to others.
On occasion, the Court likely reaches unanimity relatively easily
because the justices' perspectives on an issue already are well aligned.
Conversely, the Court may sometimes reach unanimity as a result of a
significant change in the perspective of at least one justice. Although it
is impossible to know, the Court's decision in Virginia v. Black,5 6 which
upheld (in substantial part) Virginia's statute prohibiting cross burning
with an intent to intimidate,5 7 may be the most recent example of this.
During oral argument, Justice Thomas, who ordinarily says little or
nothing, interjected with several forceful comments and questions that
reportedly had a visible emotional impact on other members of the
Court, leading one observer to speculate that he had changed the
perspectives of the other justices, who previously had expressed doubt
about the constitutionality of the statute.58
Despite the pressure to produce unanimous decisions, the Court very
often is divided. Sometimes it is so divided that "the" Court's opinion
consists of a thin majority perspective and multiple dissents. Other times
it is so vehemently divided that we get the oddest of all opinions: a
plurality opinion, in which one can barely discern the common thread
that joins those viewpoints which together constitute the Court's

55. See PERRY, supra note 48, at 148.
56. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
57. In a plurality opinion, the Court upheld the portion of the Virginia statute that outlawed
burning a cross with intent to intimidate. Id. at 363. It struck down the portion of the statute that
said, in effect, that burning a cross is prima facie evidence of intimidation. Id. at 367. Justice
Thomas dissented with respect to the latter aspect of the plurality opinion. Id. at 388-400 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
58. Linda Greenhouse, An Intense Attack by Justice Thomas on Cross-Burning,N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 2002, at Al.
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decision. The Court's opinion in Bush v. Gore59 is just one highly
visible, recent example.
Whether the Court is unanimous or bitterly divided, it arrives at
decisions through processes akin to those by which settling litigants,
legislatures, and the public at large arrive at decisions. When the Court's
decision is unanimous, we have an example of consensual decisionmaking-the very result litigants achieve when they resolve their dispute
without a final decision on the merits. When the Court's decision is not
unanimous, we have an example of decision-making by majority vote.
This is the method by which many negotiations are resolved, from three
friends' selection of a restaurant to the U.S. Congress's adoption of the
Civil Rights Act. Even when the Court reaches its decision by putting
the matter to a vote among the justices, however, some degree of
"accommodation" likely has occurred among the members of the
majority.
Some argue that the U.S. Supreme Court's structure, formal and
informal norms and procedures, and relative insulation from political
influences eliminate crass bargaining in the process by which it arrives
at its decisions, thereby encouraging moral deliberation among the
justices. 60 The Court's mandate and institutional design, the life tenure
of its members, and other factors probably do conspire to produce a
higher quality of dialogue than is typical within most other institutions
and spheres of social life. Ultimately, however, the Court renders its
decisions on contentious matters through processes available to other
institutions and groups-negotiation and voting. 61 While bargaining may
59. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
60. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 25-26 (1962) ("Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the
insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government."); RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 375 (1986) (arguing that courts are more likely to "reach sound decisions
about minority rights" than legislatures, because they are insulated from political pressure);
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 9-71 (1985) ("Judicial review ensures that the most
fundamental issues of political morality will finally be set out and debated as issues of principle and
not political power alone, a transformation that cannot succeed, in any case not fully, within the
legislature itself.").
61. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson note that claims about the Court's superior ability to
engage in moral deliberation are empirically unfounded. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON,
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 45 (1996). On the other hand, the Supreme Court law clerks
interviewed by Perry provide some evidence that the justices sometimes do engage in bargaining.
While they generally reported that the justices bargain very little with respect to their decisions on
motions for certiorari, they reported that the justices bargain more in decisions on the merits, though
less than the circuit judges for whom the clerks had served. See PERRY, supra note 48, at 150-60.
Numerous other studies have produced evidence of bargaining and strategic behavior among
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be more prevalent in other political contexts, moral deliberation does
occur, and there is no reason why it cannot be considered normative.
Viewed longitudinally, the Court appears as just another participantalbeit one with a privileged role and special powers-in a never-ending
process by which we negotiate social norms. The extent to which its role
in the construction and maintenance of legal norms influences the
ongoing construction and maintenance of social norms is discussed
below.62 Suffice it to say here, however, that the Court's ultimate
influence in the construction and maintenance of social norms is open to
question. At most, perhaps it acts sometimes as an accelerating force,
and sometimes as a crude brake, with respect to the development of
dominant social norms.
C.

Explaining the Ironies: An Implicit Reason We Litigate

If the explicit reason disputants litigate is to advance or defend some
cherished value that conflicts with a value held by one's adversary, why
do they submit their dispute to a process in which others will negotiate a
resolution that may leave them wholly or partially disappointed?
I believe that a significant, implicit reason we litigate must be that we
also value the relatively pacific resolution-or at least processing-of
disputes. Litigation provides a forum in which we can safely confront
our adversaries and be heard-by the court itself, if not by the other
party or parties. The parties' choice among available means for
addressing their dispute suggests they implicitly recognize that they, and
the court before which they have brought their dispute, are participants
in a larger social system that, overall, is worth maintaining and
attempting to enhance.6 3 The disputants, like the rest of us, inhabit a
social context in which many of their other cherished values are aligned,
even though those that are the subject of their current dispute are not.

appellate judges. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 89-124 (1997)
(surveying empirical studies of strategic behavior among judges); LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN,
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: IS PSYCHOLOGY RELEVANT? 79-81, 115-16 (1999) (presenting

evidence of bargaining and threats in memoranda circulated among U.S. Supreme Court justices).
62. See infra Part IV.A.2.
63. Some would argue that at least some litigants embrace litigation as their strongest available
strategy for opposition in light of the state's monopoly on violence. History is, however, replete
with violent uprisings and other forms of protest, so the decision to litigate clearly seems a decision
to participate in the system-to rail against some aspect of it, rather than attempt to subvert it
completely. But see ELLICKSON, supra note 18, at 144 (arguing that self-help remedies and other
laws that enable parties to use force demonstrate that the state does not monopolize violence).
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The fact that people litigate over their most deeply held values calls
into question their claims that those values are absolute. This in no way
implies that participants in an ideologically based dispute have an easy
time choosing between litigation and its alternatives, as if litigation were
just one tactic among others for expressing and attempting to advance
one's moral convictions.64 It seems little acknowledged, however, that
litigation essentially permits us to negotiate what we allege is
non-negotiable, effectively creating a market through which seemingly
incommensurable values can be traded.6 5 In the realm of significant
cases, litigation prevents-or at least buffers us against the worst
potential effects of-failures in the market for social norms.66 The
parties' competing values may be incommensurable in the abstract, but
their actual disputing behavior seems to demonstrate that they are
willing to compromise their values to some extent because they wish to
inhabit a social system that is capable of
containing and processing their
67
dispute in a reasonably pacific manner.
Litigation also plays a significant role in the construction and
maintenance of individual and group identities. As a form of social
activism, litigation has the advantage of seemingly saving disputants
64. It does appear, however, that negotiated alternatives may indeed be more easily chosen in
ideologically based disputes when litigation is an unattractive alternative. See Ann E. Tenbrunsel et
al., The Reality and Myth of Sacred Issues in Ideologically-Based Negotiations (August 7, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (presenting empirical evidence that participants in
disputes about deeply held values are more inclined to negotiate when they expect to lose a lawsuit).
65. Cass Sunstein argues that competing values truly are incommensurable, but that "the legal
system often must put problems of incommensurability to one side, leaving those problems for
ethics rather than law." Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 779, 820 (1994). In other words, courts sometimes must make binary choices between
competing values when the parties cannot synthesize them through some unitary medium of
exchange (e.g., money). If one takes a more global perspective on the role of courts in resolving
value-laden disputes, however, it is clear that litigation-not "law," but the legal processfacilitates an exchange that the parties are unwilling to make without an intermediary. In effect, the
parties synthesize, or at least coordinate, their values procedurally. Their shared desire for a
relatively pacific resolution of their dispute serves as a common currency; they trade the substantive
values they defend (in the sense of placing them at risk) in exchange for the relative social stability
they enjoy by submitting their dispute to litigation, rather than resorting to violence or taking other,
more drastic action.
66. See John A. Stookey, Trials and Tribulations:Crises, Litigation, and Legal Change, 24 LAW
& SOC'Y REV. 497, 498 (1990) (noting that "[a] 'consensus'-oriented theoretical tradition
emphasizes that litigation functions to achieve social integration when traditional forms of nonstate
control weaken").
67. Political Scientist Joseph H. Carens calls this desire a "commitment to union." Joseph H.
Carens, Compromises in Politics, in COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS 123, 136 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979).
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from making accommodative exchanges on matters they consider sacred
and incommensurable, thereby sparing competing individuals and
groups from the uncomfortable process of identity reconstruction that
might be occasioned by a consensual resolution of the dispute.68 Public
defense of one's values through litigation sends powerful signals to
one's cohorts.69 It rallies others around the same cause, making social
groups to which one belongs, and which contribute to one's self sense,
more cohesive and distinct. 70 Litigating a case through trial and multiple
appeals is a relatively public and taxing way to demonstrate the
genuineness and strength of one's convictions. 71 An activist who
attempts to advance his or her cause incrementally, through forms of
political engagement that require others' acquiescence or active support,
may be perceived as making taboo trade-offs. 7'2 Negotiation may
seriously undermine one's social identity or standing in the eyes of
others.73 For some, litigation may seem to be the only means to defend
values one considers non-negotiable without undermining one's sense of
self and risking sanction by one's peers.74
In the realm of significant cases, litigation permits disputants to
maintain a sense of absolute conviction to a cherished value while also
68. This may be the answer to Malcolm Feeley's question about why so many people resort to the
court despite its limited ability to cause broad social change. Malcolm M. Feeley, Hollow Hopes,
Flypaper, and Metaphors, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 745, 756-57 (1993) (reviewing GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)).

69. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-29 (2000) (offering a signaling theory of
individual and group identity construction).
70. It is easier to mobilize groups with strong collective identities than to mobilize loosely
connected individuals. See Michael W. McCann, Law and PoliticalStruggles for Social Change:
Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Promises in Future Research, in LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE
COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE 319, 336 (David A. Schultz ed., 1998).

71. On the other hand, litigation is less costly than violent confrontation, so it arguably makes
moral outrage easier to express. See Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable:
Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 853, 868 (2000) (suggesting that moral outrage is expressed most vehemently when
the perceived violation of the moral order is egregious and outrage is not costly to express).
72. Id. at 854; Leigh L. Thompson & Richard Gonzalez, Environmental Disputes: Competition
for Scarce Resources and Clashing Values, in ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND BEHAVIOR: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUATION AND DEGRADATION 75 (Max H. Bazerman et al.

eds., 1997).
73. See Benditt, supra note 15, at 31 ("[T]o compromise on matters of principle is to risk a loss of
esteem, not only on the part of others, but even on one's own part."); Tetlock, supra note 71, at 867
(concluding, based upon experimental evidence, that "taboo trade-offs undermine core assumptions
underlying relationships that are central to our conceptions of our selves and our social world").
74. See Tetlock, supranote 71, at 855-56 (arguing that protection of sacred values has two goals,
"to convince oneself of one's moral worthiness and... to shore up the external moral order").
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enabling them to live in a world that accommodates-and which, I
believe, they implicitly want to have the capacity to accommodate-a
diversity of competing perspectives. Litigants go to court to serve two
values, not one. One value is defended through briefs and oral argument;
the other is implicit in the choice to litigate rather than secede or use
violent forms of coercion. Adjudication is a more constructive response
to the reality of social pluralism than dueling and other forms of
violence, and that, I believe, is why we embrace it. 75 Each of the litigants
no doubt hopes that his or her perspective will prevail, but each
implicitly wishes his or her perspective to prevail within a society that is
capable of peacefully resolving even its most seemingly intractable
conflicts.
III.

IS SETTLEMENT POSSIBLE?

There is understandable skepticism about the possibility of settling
the types of disputes that give rise to significant cases. As Fiss contends,
"[w]e turn to the courts because we need to, not because of some quirk
in our personalities. '' 76 Before considering what the disputants and the
public might gain through efforts to settle the types of disputes that give
rise to significant cases, it is worth considering whether settlement is
possible in the first place.
The types of disputes that give rise to significant cases admittedly are
among the least tractable of all conflicts. Social psychologists have
discovered a number of cognitive errors and biases that systematically
distort disputants' perceptions and judgments in any negotiation, making
agreements more difficult to achieve and often less than optimal when
they do occur.77 These barriers, some of which are discussed below in
75. See HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 4 ("The alternative to disintegrating resort to violence
is the establishment of regularized and peaceable methods of decision."); Robert M. Ackerman,
Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Searchfor Community, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP.

RESOL. 27, 32 (2002) ("The disputants' willingness to submit their dispute to adjudication by a
recognized tribunal is itself an affirmation of community, far more so than the self-help remedies of
the blood feud, duel, or riot.").
76. See Fiss, supra note 2, at 1089. Fiss's skepticism about the potential for settlement of
significant cases is reinforced in his brief response to McThenia and Shaffer's critical review of
Against Settlement. Compare Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94
YALE L.J. 1660, 1664 (1985) (arguing that the goal of ADR processes is not efficient dispute
processing, but reconciliation), with Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1670 (1985)
(arguing that courts exist to resolve disputes in ajust manner when reconciliation is not possible).
77. See LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 120-39 (1998)
(surveying social psychological research on cognitive errors and biases that can affect negotiation
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Part III.B. 1, may be especially high in value-laden disputes.7 8
Researchers have observed that mainstream theories and advice about
negotiation, developed primarily with reference to ordinary disputes and
negotiations in which financial issues predominate,
are less powerful in
79
the context of ideologically based disputes.
Despite the many barriers to settlement of the types of disputes that
give rise to significant cases, two types of settlements, though rare, can
and do occur. One type can be thought of as strategic settlement.
Strategic settlement occurs when at least one of the parties is motivated
primarily by a desire to avoid the risk of an adverse decision. This party
hopes that progress can be made politically, without the burden of a
recently affirmed, adverse legal norm. Perhaps this party also hopes to
bring "better facts" before the court at a later date. The other type of
settlement results from some degree of true perspective change that
produces an informal understanding or a formal agreement regarding
action the parties will (or will not) take regarding matters of common
concern.
Strategic settlements result from bargaining, in which the goal is
maximal satisfaction of one's own interests through compromise.8 °
Perspective change results from collective moral deliberation. 81 As
explained further in Part V, the goal of moral deliberation is the
complete or partial transformation of interests, rather than their mere
aggregation. The remainder of this Part demonstrates that each type of
behavior).
78. Social psychological research confirms that, "[t1o the extent that conflicts involve people's
core values and beliefs, people will be more emotional, less able to think in an integratively
complex fashion, . . . less likely to conceive or consider tradeoffs on issues involving those core
values[,] ...

more rigid and single minded in their argument content and style[,] ...

[and] more

likely to defend these values at any cost." Wade-Benzoni, supra note 30, at 44.
79. See, e.g., Tenbrunsel, supra note 64, at 5 (observing that mainstream "[b]ehavioral
negotiation theories-which focus on agreements over scarce resources, competing issues and/or
situations in which the basic nature of the dispute is understood ... are not particularly useful for
examining negotiations ... that are rooted in differences in ideological beliefs").
80. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 57-63 (comparing deliberation and
bargaining).

81. Id.
82. Bargaining often is associated with the type of interest group dynamics that are taken for
granted by liberal political theorists, and deliberation often is associated with the republican
political ideal. For discussions of the distinction between interest group politics and republican
forms of political action, see generally Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493
(1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). See
also JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY
OF LAW and DEMOCRACY 296-97 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (associating bargaining with the
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settlement is possible-not just in theory, but also in practice.
A.

Strategic Settlement

The agreement reached shortly before the case of Piscataway
Township Board of Education v. Taxman 83 was to be heard by the U.S.
Supreme Court is an example of strategic settlement.8 4 Sharon Taxman,
a white public high school teacher in Piscataway, New Jersey, lost her
job when the school district decided to eliminate a position in her
department. 85 An African-American teacher in her department, Debra
Williams, who started her job on the same day as Taxman and was
equally qualified, was retained.86 Under New Jersey law, school
workforce reductions are to be made on the basis of seniority, with less
senior employees being laid off first.8 7 Because both teachers had
received favorable performance reviews, the school needed another basis
for making its decision about whom to release from Taxman's
department.88 The board had broken all past seniority ties by drawing
lots. 89 In this instance, however, it made the decision on racial grounds,
releasing Taxman and retaining Williams because the School Board
believed its decision would promote diversity and support the goals of
affirmative action. 90
Taxman sued, claiming reverse discrimination. 9' The trial and
appellate courts ruled in her favor,9 2 and the U.S. Supreme Court granted

liberal tradition in political theory and deliberation with republicanism).
83. 521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cert. dismissed,522 U.S. 1010 (1997).
84. This is a case of strategic settlement because the Piscataway school board settled primarily to
avoid an adverse legal precedent. See Lisa Estrada, Buying the Status Quo on Affirmative Action:
The Piscataway Settlement and Its Lessons About Interest Group Path Manipulation, 9 GEO.

MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 207, 215-16 (1999) (reporting events preceding settlement). The
settlement was not the product of changed perspectives about the underlying conflict resulting from
a process of collective moral deliberation.
85. See United States v. Bd. of Educ. 832 F. Supp. 836, 840 (D.N.J. 1993), affd en banc sub
nom. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom. Piscataway
Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).
86. Bd. ofEduc., 832 F. Supp. at 840.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 851, afj'd en banc, 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996).
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certiorari.9 3 Fearing a precedent with a negative effect on affirmative
action programs throughout the country, a coalition of civil rights groups
persuaded the school board to settle.94 The Reverend Jesse Jackson, one
of the leaders of the coalition, prevailed upon the board's president to
make Ms. Taxman a generous offer of settlement, $300,000 of which
would be supplied by the coalition. 95
Supporters and opponents of affirmative action alike decried the
Piscataway settlement. 96 Many accused both sides of selling out--of
"placing the route to the Supreme Court on the open market." 97
Nonetheless, the Piscataway settlement demonstrates that significant
cases can be, and sometimes are, settled on strategic grounds.
A strategic settlement of a significant case is not the type of win-win,
value-maximizing outcome that proponents of legal negotiation typically
promise and extol. As discussed below in Part IV.A, while strategic
settlement may occasionally be preferable to continued litigation from
the perspective of the parties and even the public, it is a win-win
outcome only in a very limited sense. While some of the various
psychological barriers to settlement may have been overcome in order to
achieve it-particularly disputants' tendency toward overconfidence
about their alternatives to settlement 98 and reactive devaluation of an
opponent's offers of settlement 99 -the fundamental psychological
dynamic among the parties has not shifted from simple, polarized
thinking to anything approaching the sort of integratively complex
thinking that proponents of settlement hope parties can achieve. Anyone
who aspires to help parties to disputes involving deep value differences

93. Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997). Writ of certiorari was
dismissed after the case settled. Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 522 U.S. 1010
(1997).
94. See Estrada, supra note 84, at 215-16 (reporting events preceding settlement).
95. Id.
96. See Nat Hentoff, Editorial, Escapingfrom the Supreme Court, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 30,
1997, at 22. It probably is fair to say, however, that opponents of affirmative action were more
distressed by the settlement than supporters. See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, Rights Settlement May
Only Have ForestalledMajor Decision, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1997, at Al 5 (reporting

outrage regarding Piscatawaysettlement expressed by affirmative action opponents); J. Scott Orr,
Affirmative Action Buys Some BreathingRoom, SUNDAY STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 23, 1997, at 13
(reporting outrage regarding Piscatawaysettlement expressed by affirmative action opponents).
97. See Hentoff, supra note 96, at 22.
98. See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 56-64
(1992) (discussing the overconfidence effect in negotiation behavior).
99. Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 389,
394-95 (1991).
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engage in the type of discourse that may result in genuine perspective
change and the emergence of creative settlement options will likely view
a strategic settlement as a missed opportunity and, at most, only a minor
validation of the potential of negotiation to contribute to the resolution
of ideological disputes.
B.

Moral Deliberation

Settlements resulting from collective moral deliberation are also
possible, though academics from disciplines other than law generally
have been more inclined to promote deliberative dispute resolution
processes and shown greater optimism about their potential to change
the perspectives of parties to ideologically based disputes. 0 0 Scholars in
social psychology,10' political science, urban planning, 10 3 and other
fields have made important theoretical, empirical, and prescriptive
contributions to our understanding of disputes involving deep value
differences and productive methods for resolving them.
1.

Barriersto Settlement

As indicated above, social psychologists have identified various
systematic biases and errors in judgment that operate as barriers to
settlement and which produce suboptimal outcomes when settlements do
100. Skepticism about the potential for settlement of ideological disputes is not, of course, limited
to legal circles. See, e.g., Carens, supra note 67, at 129 (questioning whether "integrative
compromise" is possible or desirable in disputes where one party doubts the legitimacy of another
party's perspective); Martin P. Golding, The Nature of Compromise: A Preliminary Inquiry, in
COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS 3, 10-11 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1979) ("It is far from clear that conflicts that are rooted in differences of principle or
ideology ... can be terminated either by a directly negotiated compromise or by submission to a
third party.").
101. See, e.g., Tenbrunsel, supra note 64, at 23-24 (presenting evidence that negotiators on either
side of an environmental issue tend to be more open to compromise if they expect to lose a lawsuit
on the issue); Thompson & Gonzalez, supra note 72, at 84-98 (discussing psychological obstacles
to the resolution of ideological disputes and offering prescriptions for overcoming them); WadeBenzoni, supra note 30, at 43-46, 51-53 (discussing value differences as a barrier to conflict
resolution and offering suggestions for further research regarding value conflict and its resolution).
102. See infra Part V.
103. See generally JOHN FORESTER, THE DELIBERATIVE PRACTITIONER: ENCOURAGING
PARTICIPATORY PLANNING PROCESSES (1999) (encouraging deliberative approach to resolution of
urban planning disputes and other difficult conflicts over resource use); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND &
PATRICK FIELD, DEALING

WITH AN ANGRY PUBLIC: THE MUTUAL GAINS APPROACH TO

RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1996) (encouraging deliberative approach to resolution of urban
planning disputes and other difficult conflicts over resource use).
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Skilled mediators sometimes can help disputants overcome
these barriers to settlement, producing changed perspectives about the
dispute and the possibilities for its resolution.' 0 5 Research and practical
experience demonstrate that disputants who manage to overcome winlose thinking and other psychological obstacles to settlement often
achieve more satisfactory results through cooperation, both individually
10 6
and collectively, than they would through continued conflict.
Some psychological barriers to settlement may be particularly high in
ideologically based disputes. These include the tendencies to attribute
more extreme and homogenous views to one's opponents, and even to
one's own cohorts, than they actually hold; to resist making trade-offs
one considers taboo; and to apply self-serving notions of fairness.'0 7
Research by social psychologists establishes that participants in the
types of disputes that give rise to significant cases typically view
themselves as reasonable and ready to cooperate, while falsely viewing
others as unreasonable and unwilling to cooperate-an attribution error
that has been aptly named naYve realism. 0 8 Researchers have found that
"when each group is asked to name the cause of the dispute, each will
attribute the negative aspects of the conflict to the dispositions of the
other party."' 1 9 In essence, parties on all sides of disputes involving deep
value differences falsely believe that others, unlike themselves, are
completely intransigent" l 0 One or both sides tend to "greatly exaggerate
the difference between their own and the other's belief systems in a way
that exacerbate[s] the conflict."'" In disputes regarding fundamental
occur.

10 4

104. See THOMPSON, supra note 77, at 124-34.

105. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION
2, 22-23 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (discussing mediator's role in overcoming psychological
and non-psychological barriers to settlement).
106. See generally Max H. Bazerman et al., "You CAN'T ENLARGE THE PIE": SIx BARRIERS TO
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (2001).

107. Thompson & Gonzalez, supra note 72, at 84-94 (discussing these and other cognitive errors
and biases that operate as barriers to resolution of value-laden conflicts).
108. See Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual versus Assumed Differences in Construal: "Naive
Realism " in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 404-05
(1995); Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortionsin the Attribution

Process, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173 (Leonard Berkowitz ed.,
1977).
109. See THOMPSON, supra note 77, at 268.
110. The same often may be true of the lawyers that represent them.
111. THOMPSON, supra note 77, at 268. Interestingly, while liberal and conservative research
subjects in studies by Robinson and his colleagues considered the views of members of the opposite
group to be more extreme than they actually were, liberals, "neutrals," and even conservatives
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values, each side tends to attribute to the other extreme attitudes they do
not actually hold. 1 2 Disputants also tend to perceive "the other side to be
more uniform in their views, whereas they perceiv[e] their own views to
be more varied and heterogeneous." ' 1 3 Consequently, "[t]he general
principle appears to be that coercion is viewed as more effective with
our enemies than with ourselves, whereas conciliation
is viewed as more
14
enemies."''
our
with
than
ourselves
with
effective
In a study of English teachers on opposite sides of the "Great Books"
debate, for example, social psychologists Robert Robinson and Dacher
Keltner found that traditionalists exaggerated the position of revisionist
teachers, attributing to the revisionists an exaggerated degree of
ideological difference and predicting a degree of oppositional behavior
that they did not exhibit." 5 Traditionalists and revisionists on average
selected seven books in common when asked to develop a fifteen-book
reading list for an introductory college literature course. 1 6 Another
example: a March 2000 poll found that eighty-three percent of
Americans believe evolution should be taught in the schools, and
seventy-nine percent believe creationism should be taught. In other
words, a very substantial number of Americans believe students should
be exposed to both perspectives." 17 These and other studies suggest there
is often less ideological and practical distance between opposing moral
communities than individuals on each side of a dispute realize."'
Interestingly, individual disputants tend to believe that it is not only
themselves overestimated the extremeness of the views held by conservatives. Robinson, supra note
108, at 414. The researchers found that, in general, liberals tend to be less accurate in their construal
of their adversaries, while conservatives tend to be less accurate in their construal of their peers. Id.
at 413.
112. Robert Robinson & Dacher Keltner, Much Ado About Nothing? Revisionists and
TraditionalistsChoose an Introductory English Syllabus, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 18, 24 (1996).
113. THOMPSON, supra note 77, at 268 (citing P.W. Linville ct al., Perceived Distributions of
Characteristics of In-group and Out-group Members: Empirical Evidence and a Computer
Simulation, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 165-88 (1989)).

114. Thompson & Gonzalez, supra note 72, at 90.
115. Robinson & Keltner, supra note 112, at 21.
116. Id.
117. James Glanz, Survey Finds Support Is Strongfor Teaching 2 Origin Theories, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2000, at Al.
118. See, e.g., ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL: WHAT MIDDLE-CLASS AMERICANS
REALLY THINK ABOUT GOD, COUNTRY, FAMILY, RACISM, WELFARE, IMMIGRATION,
HOMOSEXUALITY, WORK, THE RIGHT, THE LEFT, AND EACH OTHER 268-74 (1998) (summarizing
evidence, presented earlier in the book, that the majority of middle-class Americans are not deeply
divided over moral issues).

909
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their enemies whose beliefs are ideologically predetermined (unlike their
own views, which they see as based upon reasonable interpretations of
all available evidence); who are less capable of seeing "shades of gray";
and who are less open to conciliation. As Robert J. Robinson, Dacher
Keltner, Andrew Ward and Lee Ross found in their studies of pro-choice
and pro-life views of partisanship in the abortion debate and of liberal
and conservative views regarding the 1986 Howard Beach racial
incident, partisans also believe their own cohorts are "extreme,
unreasonable, and unreachable," though somewhat less so than their
opponents.119 In other words, many of us privately see ourselves as
complex moral thinkers who are surrounded by ideologues both within
and outside our own moral community.
As Robinson and his colleagues explain, the consequences of this
belief are unfortunate: "Partisans, accordingly, are apt to underestimate
the possibility of finding common ground that could provide the basis
for conciliation and constructive action; as a consequence, they could be
reluctant to enter into the type of frank dialogue that could
reveal ... commonalities in interests or beliefs., 120 They also are
reluctant to signal "their doubts or ambivalence to their ideological
peers-lest they face coolness, suspicion, criticism, or even
ostracism.", 12' The bitter irony is that many individuals on each side of
an ideologically based dispute may believe that all parties could profit
from cooperation, but few are willing to engage in dialogue because they
believe the risks of proposing it are too great in light of their low
expectations about the likelihood of success.
All of this is not to say, however, that the differences between parties
to the types of disputes that give rise to significant cases are not real and
substantial. At times, there may be very little overlap between their
underlying values (save their implicit willingness to resolve the dispute
through relatively peaceful means). Perhaps more commonly, disputants
embrace a similar set of values in the abstract, but place dramatically
inverted emphasis on them in the context of their dispute. 22 Pro-choice
advocates generally do not dispute the sanctity of life and the value of
the family. Pro-life advocates typically do not entirely reject the

119. Robinson, supra note 108, at 405.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 415.

122. See Benditt, supra note 15, at 34 (noting that conflicts of principle may arise from "different
weights being given to similar principles").
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principles of individual freedom and self-determination. In the abortion
context, however, each privileges one set of values over the other.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that disputants tend to systematically
attribute more extreme and homogenous views to both one's opponents
and one's peers than they actually hold, and this tendency creates a
significant barrier to settlement.
A second psychological barrier to settlement, which was briefly
introduced above,123 is related to this first one. To believe that one's
adversaries and one's cohorts hold pure and highly polarized views
regarding the subject matter of a dispute is to believe that both see the
dispute as a zero-sum game in which cooperation is not possible. As
indicated above, however, if one privately believes cooperation may be
possible, one may nonetheless be reluctant to cooperate, in part because
of the social signaling costs one would incur, both in terms of one's own
reputation and in terms of the threat to group cohesiveness. When an
issue is viewed as sacred, any exchange related to it is likely to be
considered a "taboo tradeoff' that would invite the scorn of one's peers
and compromise one's sense of self-worth and social standing.1 24 If one
is afraid even to publicly suggest that a contested issue may be
somewhat morally ambiguous, it follows that one will be even more
afraid to actually act as if that is the case. As Wade-Benzoni and her
colleagues explain, however, "[t]he simple truth is that it is virtually
impossible for people not to make trade-offs among core values, since
tradeoffs are a consequence of social existence."'125 Common sense and

empirical evidence 26 confirm that the degree to which one holds a value
to be sacred often is situational, depending to a significant
extent on how
27
1
position.
inflexible
an
maintain
to
afford
can
much one
123. See supra Part I.C.
124. Tetlock, supranote 71, at 854.
125. Wade-Benzoni, supra note 30, at 45 (citing MILTON ROKEACH, THE NATURE OF HUMAN
VALUES (1973); Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs,
Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 853

(2000)).
126. See, e.g., Jonathan Baron & Sarah Leshner, How Serious Are Expressions of Protected
Values?, J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 183 (2000) (providing empirical evidence that
values proclaimed to be sacred change based on situational factors); Tenbrunsel, supra note 64, at
21-22 (reporting evidence that suggests that parties to ideological disputes who see litigation as
their alternative to agreement, and who believe they are likely to lose in court, are more likely to
settle).
127. As I argue above, litigation masks this reality by creating a mechanism by which such tradeoffs occur without the appearance that one has treated the core value one seeks to defend as
commensurable with other values (e.g., maintaining social order). The mechanism (adjudication)
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Another potentially significant barrier to settlement of ideological
disputes is the tendency of disputants to be self-serving--and to be
completely unaware that they are being self-serving-in their
perceptions and judgments regarding fairness. 128 Disputants tend to
focus on information that favors their own interests, discount
information that favors others' interests, and thus apply fairness
principles in self-serving ways, claiming for themselves more of
whatever (material or symbolic) resources are available for trade than an
independent third party would award to each of them. 129 In a dispute
over forest use, fishing rights or pollution, for example,
environmentalists and parties representing commercial interests may
have difficulty agreeing on what level of resource use or degradation is
fair under the circumstances.
Wade-Benzoni and her colleagues speculate that such "egocentric
interpretations of fairness" may be especially pronounced in ideological
disputes. 30 Beliefs about what is fair in ideologically based conflicts
emerge from moral beliefs, which are deeply ingrained, hard to change,
and associated with powerful emotions. In addition, outcomes are tied to
issues of high importance, so the parties believe there is much at stake.
Under such circumstances it is difficult for individuals to engage in
reciprocal perspective taking (i.e., trying to see the situation from the
other party's point of view), which has been shown to help mitigate
egocentrism. 131
Egocentrism tends to be more extreme in disputes that involve a great
deal of uncertainty, 32 either because there is disagreement about what
counts as evidence, because evidence is lacking, or because the
standards in light of which evidence should be judged are disputed. As
we have seen, the types of disputes that produce significant cases often
exhibit one or more of these characteristics.

operates by transferring decision authority from the principal parties in the dispute to third parties
who negotiate for them. To participate, one must accept the risk that these third parties will return a
decision that wholly or partially repudiates the core value one seeks to defend. The trade-offs made
in settlement are taboo only because those made through litigation remain implicit. See supra
Part I.C.
128. Wade-Benzoni, supra note 30, at 43-44.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 44.
132. Id.
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2.

Overcoming Barriersto Settlement

To overcome these and other psychological barriers to settlement of
an ideological dispute, one or more of the disputants must achieve a
measure of perspective change sufficient to make settlement appear
more attractive than continued litigation. At least one of the parties must
come to view the other(s) as less extreme and more reasonable; view the
dispute, or at least aspects of it, as amenable to win-win resolution; view
possible trade-offs as less likely to be personally destabilizing and
stigmatizing, or become more willing to accept potential ostracism; or
view the facts and circumstances surrounding the dispute, and the
options for its resolution, less egocentrically.
Unsurprisingly, research on attitude change indicates that the stronger
133
one's perspective on an issue, the more resistant one is to change.
However, this same body of research indicates that perspective change is
possible, even where one's perspectives are strongly held. Most people
are open to influence through deliberation and respectful persuasive
appeals. 134 Activities and experiences that tend to produce perspective
change over time include: sustained exposure to alternate perspectives;
appeals to shared values; experiencing the cognitive dissonance that
comes from recognition of kernels of truth in another's perspective and
the potential, negative extremes of one's own position; exploring the
complexity of and internal inconsistencies within one's own perspectives
and value set; and humanizing interactions with one's opponents. 135
These findings are consistent with research, discussed above, indicating
that most partisans afford themselves the capacity for change (even if
they deny others the same potential).1 36 Skilled mediators and other
types of facilitators can help parties reduce psychological barriers to
settlement by creating and guiding them through processes in1 37which
activities and experiences that produce perspective change occur.'
133. Alice H. Eagly & Patrick Kulesa, Attitudes, Attitude Structure, and Resistance to Change:
Implications for Persuasion on Environmental Issues, in ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND BEHAVIOR

122, 129-30 (Max H. Bazerman et al. eds., 1997).
134. Id. at 130-37.
135. Id. Tenbrunsel and her colleagues also recommend encouraging disputants to realistically
assess their alternatives to reaching agreement, a prescription that is consistent with the mainstream
theories of negotiation that they consider less powerful in the context of ideological disputes.
Tenbrunsel, supra note 64, at 25.
136. See supra Part III.B.I.
137. In negotiation analytic terms, they attempt to influence the parties' perceptions of their
reservation values and the Pareto frontier, creating a zone of possible agreement where none
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Perspective change may indeed be difficult to achieve, but the
evidence indicates that it can and does occur. Perspective change does
not necessarily entail abandonment, or even deep questioning, of one's
fundamental values. However, it does entail a minimal recognition that
one's own values and those held by one's adversaries can co-exist and,
at least to some extent, be practically accommodated. For example,
mediators in Colorado helped a diverse group of state officials, activists,
conservative Christians, and others achieve consensus on a plan for
138
utilizing federal funds available for HIV prevention programs.
Similarly, dialogues sponsored by the Network for Life and Choice have
produced collaboration among pro-life and pro-choice activists on
programs designed to minimize the number of unwanted pregnancies,
assist pregnant drug addicts, and promote adoption, among other
initiatives. 139 Parties to such agreements typically do not surrender their
values or beliefs, but they do achieve sufficient mutual recognition and
tolerance to make possible coordinated efforts to address a problem
about which all are concerned.140 They reach "consensus not on
paradigms, value systems,
or belief systems but on practical options to
14 1
support together."'

Even if the respective value systems of the parties in the two disputes
previously existed. See, e.g., HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 139
(1982) (explaining the concept of the Pareto frontier); HOWARD RAIFFA, NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS:
THE SCIENCE AND ART OF COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING 110-12 (1982) [hereinafter,
SCIENCE AND ART] (explaining the concept of zone of possible agreement). In the context of

ideological disputes, the parties' reservation values are, or are defined by, the sacred values they
seek to defend. Sacred values may be harder to maintain when one is prevented from quickly
coming to moral closure on a dilemma that implicates them. See Tetlock, supra note 71, at 867 ("If
this process of reaching rapid moral closure is impeded, the mental self-control necessary for
preserving taboos can become more problematic. The boundaries of the unthinkable do shift over
time."). Good faith participation in deliberative exercises with one's ideological opponents may
stimulate an attitude of moral openness, rather than moral closure.
138. John Forester, Dealing with Deep Value Differences, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING
HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 463, 479-89 (Lawerence
Susskind et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter Dealing]; see generally Michael A. Hughes, Facilitating
Statewide HIVIAIDS Policies and Priorities in Colorado, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING
HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 1011 (Lawrence Susskind et al.

eds., 1999) (case study).
139. Michelle LeBaron & Nike Carstarphen, Finding Common Ground on Abortion, in THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 1031,
1032, 1045 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999).
140. Forester considers this focus on practical alternatives, as opposed to misguided efforts to
produce a synthesis of the parties' value systems, to be the true wisdom of mediation. Forester,
Dealing,supranote 138, at 489.
141. LeBaron & Carstarphen, supra note 139, at 483.
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just discussed remained largely unchanged, the resolutions they achieved
are markedly different from the settlement produced by the parties to the
Piscataway case. Their settlements were not tactical moves in the
service of an overarching adversarial strategy, but genuine efforts to
accommodate conflicting perspectives in a manner each party
presumably hoped would prove to be durable and, at least to some
degree, mutually beneficial. If the parties' fundamental moral
perspectives did not change, their perspectives about each other and the
possibilities for cooperation on matters where their interests are aligned
certainly did.
Of course, opportunities to promote perspective change may be
limited if attorneys, professional activists, and others who lead or
represent social groups are conditioned to believe that it is unattainable
or undesirable. Wade-Benzoni and her colleagues argue that institutions
represent yet another barrier to settlement of ideologically based
disputes. 142 Institutions are social structures that influence our behavior,
perceptions, and judgments, 143 including our expectations about what is
possible and socially acceptable. They include professional culturestheir processes of education and socialization, the incentive structures
that permeate them, and the norms that regulate them. To the extent that
members of the legal profession, as a result of legal education, incentive
structures, 44 and other influences, are conditioned to believe that
settlement of significant cases is impossible or without potential benefit
to the parties or society, this represents a powerful barrier to consensual
resolution of the ideologically based disputes that give rise to them. As
Jules Lobel observes, "in a nation like ours, where the idea of justice
historically has been attached to courts and judicial proceedings, it is
inevitable that lawyers who are connected with radical social movements
will introduce their struggles into the judicial arena ....
,,45 Those
involved in ideologically based disputes frequently turn to lawyers for
guidance and assistance in obtaining redress. If lawyers fail to see, or
excessively discount, the potential value of negotiation as a strategy for
serving their clients' interests, this may make settlement of ideologically
142. Wade-Benzoni, supra note 30, at 47-51.
143. Id. at 47.
144. Needless to say, lawyers often have a vested interest in litigating, not just for financial gain,
but for reputational gains and ideological satisfaction. See Feeley, supra note 68, at 758 (arguing
that lawyers enhance their own social power by "promoting the belief in an extraordinarily powerful
court" capable of causing sweeping social change).
145. Lobel, supra note 36, at 1355.
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based disputes all the more infrequent, because they may fail to
recognize, or may counsel their clients146against exploring, possibilities
for consensual resolution of the dispute.
Of course, there is little hope for overcoming these barriers to
settlement if the disputants and their representatives do not appreciate
the potential benefits of settlement, both to themselves and to society
more generally. Any assessment of potential benefits must, however,
acknowledge the costs of settlement. I discuss these costs and benefits in
the next Part.
IV. POTENTIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SETTLING
SIGNIFICANT CASES
One may advocate litigation of significant cases because one believes
settlement is not possible or because it is better for the parties and
society in very practical ways, but I find it difficult to regard the U.S.
Supreme Court as an institution peculiarly capable of making moral
judgments.147 Given that the Court often compromises through a stylized
blend of the same decision-making processes used by other political
institutions and social groups (i.e., negotiation and voting), 148 it is
difficult to view the Court as a body uniquely capable of dispensing
justice and of articulating "our chosen ideals.' 49 Indeed, each word in
this brief quote from Fiss's Against Settlement-our, chosen, ideals-is
questionable. As others have argued extensively, the judiciary is in many
senses the least democratic of the three branches of government because
it is unelected and does not consult the full spectrum of its constituents
before acting,15 0 so a Supreme Court decision arguably expresses "our"
146. Menkel-Meadow argues that lawyers not only should embrace negotiation as a credible
alternative to litigation for achieving just resolutions of disputes, but that lawyers are particularly
well qualified to help parties reach consensus by virtue of their greater "process consciousness." See
Menkel-Meadow, PursuingPeace,supra note 10, at 1763.
147. The Court has sometimes acknowledged as much. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159
(1973) ("When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are
unable to arrive at any consensus [in response to the difficult question of when life begins], the
judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to
the answer.").
148. See supra Part II.B.

149. Fiss, supra note 2, at 1089.
150. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 152-54
(2002) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court's scope of review should be limited because the
judiciary is not accountable to the public through elections). The so-called "countermajoritarian
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ideals in a very thin sense, if one grants that it expresses them at all.
Parties to litigation typically represent only a small sampling of the
range of perspectives on an issue. When the Court fully validates the
perspective of one of the parties, others' perspectives obviously are
discounted. When it does not fully validate either party's perspective,
perhaps the most we can say is that the Court's opinion represents the
chosen ideals of the justices who joined it, as well as those who happen
to agree with them after the fact. Because many majority opinions result
from some degree of "accommodation" (i.e., compromise), however,
one can legitimately question whether these opinions even express the
signatories' chosen ideals as purely as Fiss and others imagine.
Adjudication is but one process for managing social conflict; the
judiciary is but one institution among many that assist in social
coordination and the development of social norms. Accordingly, we
must consider what the parties and society gain and lose by turning to
the courts to settle not only ordinary cases, but also the types of disputes
that give rise to significant cases. Even in the realm of significant cases,
litigation's ultimate value can be assessed only by comparison to other
available means for managing the dispute.
Too little sustained attention has been given to the comparative costs
and benefits of litigation versus settlement of significant cases, because,
with a few notable exceptions discussed below, almost all of the
literature on legal negotiation, and most of the literature on negotiation
generally, focuses on ordinary disputes. As Leigh Thompson and
Richard Gonzalez explain, "[t]he negotiation literature, in a sense,
conveniently sidesteps the problem of values by focusing on trade-offs
of interests among parties who are already in agreement on the basic
nature of the dispute."' 51 Settlement of a significant case, or of a dispute
that could give rise to one, involves both costs and benefits for the
parties and the public, and the costs and benefits differ depending upon
whether settlement occurs for strategic reasons or results from changed
difficulty" is, of course, one of the central preoccupations of U.S. constitutional law. See generally
Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) (offering historical account of counter-majoritarian
concerns with judicial activity); G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional
Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002) (offering historical account of counter-majoritarian
concerns with judicial activity).
151. Thompson & Gonzalez, supra note 72, at 99; see also Alexander, supra note 18, at 596
("Our willingness to accept the [economic] model as descriptively accurate may owe much to its
intuitive ring of truth in our experience of paradigm lawsuits such as simple, two-party breach of
contract or personal injury cases, the sorts of cases on which the models are usually based.").
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perspectives about the dispute.
In the first major subpart below, I consider the potential costs and
benefits of strategic settlement. I am not suggesting that we should
actively promote coarse bargaining over litigation of significant cases,
but I believe we should not be surprised, or consider it an abomination,
when a strategically motivated settlement does occur. In the second
major subpart below, I consider the potential costs and benefits of
settlements born of genuine perspective change resulting from the
disputants' participation in types of deliberative processes that can be
distinguished from the sort of coarse bargaining that produces strategic
settlements. While I acknowledge the limitations and potential costs of
such deliberative processes, I argue that, unlike coarse bargaining, we
should actively promote deliberative processes as a method for helping
parties explore whether their respective values, needs and preferences, as
well as the public interest, might be better served through settlement
than through continued litigation.
Whether settlement results from bargaining or moral deliberation, the
parties incur two primary types of costs when a significant case is
settled: opportunity costs and signaling costs. 152 Settlement obviously
implies foregoing the opportunity to litigate and the potential benefits
litigation may produce. It also sends signals to others that may damage
one's reputation or threaten the cohesion of social groups to which one
belongs. Others share in these costs because legal norms are public
goods and events that affect group cohesion and inter-group relations
may have ripple effects throughout a culture. The potential benefits to
the parties and the public are varied and, therefore, harder to generalize.
As discussed below, the relative costs and benefits of settlement take on
a different character, depending upon whether they are being assessed in
the context of a strategic settlement or a settlement resulting from
genuine moral deliberation.
A.

Strategic Settlement

When one or more of the parties to a significant case is unwilling to
examine their own values and commitments critically, or to explore the

152. For a brief discussion of opportunity costs in the context of legal disputes, see MNOOKIN,
supra note 12, at 226 ("For a legal dispute, pursuing litigation is typically a client's [best alternative
to a negotiated agreement]. A rational settlement process requires that a client compare the
advantages and disadvantages of a possible settlement with the opportunities and risks of
litigation."). For a discussion of signaling costs, see POSNER, supra note 69, at 18-22.
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potential for cooperation on practical matters despite their conflicting
values, the case is unlikely to settle unless at least one of the parties
wishes to do so for strategic reasons, as did the school district and its
supporters in the Piscatawaycase.
1.

PotentialCosts and Benefits to the Disputants

From the perspective of a party involved in a significant case, the
benefits and costs of strategic settlement are fairly obvious. By
definition, each party offers the other something in settlement that the
other values more than the outcome it desires from litigation, discounted
by its estimate of the probability of an unfavorable ruling.153 For both
parties in the Piscataway case (and, presumably, for at least some of
those who advised or otherwise supported them), the perceived benefits
of settlement apparently exceeded the perceived costs.
The opportunity costs incurred by one or both parties to a strategic
settlement include foregoing the chance to establish or reinforce a legal
norm aligned with one's values, and the ancillary benefits that flow from
the norm (e.g., public vindication of one's perspective and the
bargaining endowments legal norms afford those whom they favor).
They also include the intra- and interpersonal benefits that might flow
from defending those values by litigating a case to final resolution,
regardless of whether one wins or loses the litigation or achieves some
intermediate result: certainty that one is serving one's deepest beliefs
and principles, increased status and influence within a social movement,
and stronger bonds within one's group. When all parties tacitly
acknowledge that the court is more likely to rule in favor of one of the
parties, these opportunity costs theoretically are borne to a greater
degree by the party favored to win the lawsuit if it is not settled.
Signaling costs result from the symbolic significance of the
disputants' behavior.15 4 In our society, litigation is one prominent
method by which moral communities express themselves, becoming
more cohesive in the process. Litigation is an especially public and
costly way of signaling the strength of one's convictions. When the
parties settled the Piscatawaycase, those observers on both sides of the
issue who expressed shock and dismay no doubt reacted that way, at
least in part, because of the ambiguous signals the settlement sent, and

153. See MNOOKIN, supra note 12, at 101-07.

154. See POSNER, supra note 69, at 18-22.
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because of the potential for those ambiguous signals to erode the
cohesiveness of the parties' respective moral communities. 5 5 These
strong, negative reactions from some stakeholders on each side of the
affirmative action issue who were not party to the lawsuit were signals to
those within and outside their own communities that they believe the
opposing perspectives in the dispute truly are incommensurable, despite
the fact that the parties to the lawsuit apparently disagreed. Through
their expressions of outrage,.nonparties on both sides of the affirmative
action debate signaled their view that the settling parties had defected
from their respective communities by treating as commensurable that
which those protesting the settlement consider to be absolute.
From the perspective of a party to a strategic settlement, the decision
to settle certainly may strain relations with at least some of one's
cohorts. A group's most ardent members may interpret the settlement as
a complete renunciation of the group's values, and thus a complete
defection from the group. The signals sent by a strategic settlement are,
however, ambiguous. The Piscataway school board and its supporters
believed they were defending their principles in the most strategic way
possible at the moment they settled, and not that they were abandoning
their principles. 56 Ms. Taxman perhaps believed that she already had
adequately demonstrated the merits of her perspective. Because most
moral communities are not completely homogeneous, at least some of
each party's cohorts are likely to interpret the settlement not as a
defection from the group, but as a principled response to a complex
decision problem.
Why might a party like Ms. Taxman, who was favored to win her
case, decide that the benefits of settlement outweigh the costs? In very
general terms, the value of the school district's settlement offer
obviously exceeded the risk-adjusted value Ms. Taxman placed on the
opportunity to have her case heard by the highest court in the land, and
the benefits she hoped would flow from the hearing. Given the personal
and public significance of the principles at stake in the litigation,
however, how could she reach this conclusion?
As previously discussed, success in litigation is never assured, so the
prospect of an unfavorable or compromise ruling naturally influences a
155. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
156. See Abby Goodnough, Why Piscataway Decided to Avoid Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
1997, at B5 (reporting that Piscataway school board members elected to settle because they were
persuaded the U.S. Supreme Court would use the case as an opportunity to abolish affirmative
action).
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party's decision regarding settlement. In addition, the parties' (as well as
onlookers') relative tolerance for risk may differ. Many people prefer a
certain result to a speculative result with a higher utility value (i.e., they
choose the certain outcome even though the probability adjusted value of
the speculative outcome is greater). 157 Furthermore, even a party
engaged in an ideological dispute values things other than those
principles implicated in the dispute. By accepting a monetary settlement
from the school district, Ms. Taxman could claim vindication of her
principles, obtain a substantial sum for her material support, and avoid
the expense, stress and other costs of continued litigation. Ms. Taxman
may never have intended to create a lasting precedent on reverse
discrimination,
but only to obtain redress for the harm she felt she had
158
suffered.
Opponents of affirmative action who were upset by Ms. Taxman's
decision seem ignorant of how they seemingly expected her to bear
privately all or most of the expense of establishing the public good they
desired. Ms. Taxman understandably may have felt she already had
borne an adequate share of the costs of defending her perspective for the
benefit of others similarly situated, that she had created a significant
public good through her trial and appellate court victories, and that
declining the school district's settlement offer was too great a personal
cost to bear in light of the risks of continued litigation.
Sophisticated parties in Ms. Taxman's position also are no doubt
aware of the possibility of repeat play. While the settlement obviously
had preclusion effect, thereby prohibiting Ms. Taxman from attempting
to re-litigate her claim, 159 she may have been aware that a similarly
situated person might later press his or her claim to final resolution
before the U.S. Supreme Court. Ms. Taxman established a line of
precedents that has significant strategic value to those who share her
perspective on affirmative action. Perhaps she ultimately cared less
about establishing a clear, universal legal norm against reverse
discrimination than about publicly defending her own professional
competence. Perhaps Ms. Taxman also believed that the signals sent by
157. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRIA 263, 288 (1979).
158. McCann's research suggests that many lawsuits on contentious moral issues are filed for the
same reason that many ordinary cases are filed: to extract concessions through settlement, rather
than to obtain a final judgment. See McCann, supra note 70, at 340.
159. See Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29, 32 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that an
agreement dismissing civil suit bars future action on same claims).
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her decision to settle, while ambiguous, were unlikely to destabilize the
broader community of affirmative action opponents or subject her to
insufferable ridicule among her like-minded associates.
The Piscataway school district's motivations for settling are easier to
understand, regardless of whether one agrees with its decision. Both the
school district and the advocacy groups that intervened on its behalf
obviously felt that the risk-adjusted value of avoiding a U.S. Supreme
Court ruling on the merits of the case exceeded the value of the funds
paid to Ms. Taxman to settle the dispute. The school district and its allies
sought to avoid a negative precedent in hope that a positive one might be
at least that a negative precedent could be
obtained at a later time--or
1 60
postponed indefinitely.
In light of the way the case had evolved through trial and its first.,
appeal, and given the defendant's and its supporters' reasonable fears
about the probable outcome of a hearing before the Supreme Court as it
was then constituted, the opportunity costs of settlement for the school
district and its supporters arguably were not great. No doubt their biggest
concern was the potential signaling costs of settlement. Those costs
seem modest considering the high cost of an unfavorable U.S. Supreme
Court decision, and the school district's and its supporters' strong
expectation of a negative decision.1 61 At any rate, the Piscataway case
demonstrates that settlement on strategic grounds will occasionally be
desirable to at least one of the parties if a dispute evolves in a particular
way, and that there may be terms on which the other party will be
amenable to settlement.
2.

PotentialSocial Costs and Benefits

From the public's perspective, the principal cost of strategic
settlement is the missed opportunity to create, reinforce, or refine a legal
norm. Judge-made norms arguably can contribute to the maximization of
160. Our courts are designed to make inputs into our fund of social norms only in response to
requests by citizens and governmental actors for rulings on particular issues that they cannot resolve
themselves. Because the courts' inputs carry significant, if limited, weight, parties are rightfully
cautious about which issues they submit to the courts for resolution, and when. As Lisa Estrada
explains, "[t]he idea that interest groups come before our nation's courts to influence or guide the
As a pioneering civil rights lawyer in the middle part of
litigation process is far from original ....
this century, Thurgood Marshall ... meticulously select[ed] and advanc[ed] court cases which fit
his strategy of laying a brick-by-brick foundation of court precedents that would ultimately support
a school desegregation ruling in Brown v. Board of Education .... " Estrada, supra note 84, at 21718 (citations omitted).

161. See Goodnough, supra note 156, at B5.
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public welfare by, for example, establishing fundamental rights intended
to protect vulnerable members of our society, 162 helping reduce the risk
of physical injuries to acceptable levels in light of the costs of
prevention,1 63 and reducing waste in the use of resources (e.g., by
ensuring resources reach those who value them most, even if promises
must be broken in the process). 164 The missed opportunity to develop
legal norms is one of the principal
costs of settlement of significant cases
65
cite.'
critics
other
and
that Fiss
From the public's perspective, there are at least two major reasons not
to lament this opportunity cost when strategic settlements occur. One is
the risk of a "wrong" decision by the Court. The other is the
questionable ability of a judicial decision to contribute decisively to the
resolution of social conflict involving deeply held values.
In the realm of significant cases, where perspectives are so polarized,
there is good reason not to be overly solicitous of the Court's perspective
on an issue. Needless to say, it is difficult to judge, from anything like a
neutral perspective, whether a given legal norm on a divisive moral issue
166
would maximize social welfare or otherwise be morally "right."'
Different norms obviously suggest different visions of society. How
162. Two important contemporary examples are Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954) (mandating school desegregation on the grounds that African-American students could not
obtain an equivalent education in segregated schools) and Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 34445 (1963) (establishing right to counsel in criminal proceedings).
163. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 312 (1987) (arguing that "the rules of Anglo-American common law of torts are best
explained as if designed to promote efficiency in the sense of minimizing the sum of expected
damages and costs of care").
164. The following hypothetical illustrates this concept:
[I]f a seller (S)owns a widget that S values at $90, that one buyer (B1) values at $110, and
that another buyer (B2) values at $130, an efficient legal rule is one that will induce the parties
to behave in such a way that B2 will get the widget at a cost of no more than $130 and S will
get at least $90. A rule under which S would keep the widget would not be efficient. Nor
would a rule under which B I ended up with the widget. (However, a rule under which S sold
the widget to BI and BI then sold the widget to B2 would be efficient.)
E. Allan Farnsworth & William F. Young, Contracts: Cases and Materials 20 (5th ed. 1995).
165. See Fiss, supra note 2, at 1087 (arguing that settlement of significant cases leaves unsatisfied
some "genuine social need for an authoritative interpretation of law"); Luban, Erosion, supra note
9, at 2623 ("[A]djudication may often prove superior to settlement for securing peace because the
former, unlike the latter, creates rules and precedents.").
166. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, Are There Right Answers to Legal Questions?, in THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 197 (1990). For many affirmative action opponents, the Piscataway

case fell into Professor Fiss's fourth category of significant cases-those where "justice must be
done." See Fiss, supra note 2, at 1087. Many supporters of affirmative action undoubtedly would
have felt that justice had not been done if the court had ruled in Ms. Taxman's favor, as it was
widely expected to do.
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much abortion is optimal as a matter of substantive social policy: none;
free access to abortion procedures through full state subsidies at any
point during pregnancy, regardless of financial need; or something inbetween these two poles? This question is not answerable in any
meaningful, non-ideological sense in the absence of a broad consensus
on the value trade-offs implicit in a given policy choice. Utilitarian
policy analysis can tell us something about abortion's role in
maintaining sustainable population growth in both overpopulated
regions and countries where the birth rate is undesirably low, but only
the most ardent utilitarian seeking to stem or promote population growth
of analysis as the primary basis for establishment
will embrace this type
167
of abortion policy.
Some who reject utilitarian policy justifications for legal norms argue
in favor of deontological norms in the form of fundamental legal
rights.' 68 A right created by a court or legislature for one party's benefit,
however, often is a right denied to another party, or a significant interest
compromised. 169 Any humane, democratic society must establish and
protect a set of baseline liberties and opportunities, but liberties and
opportunities often clash, and locating the baseline can be contentious.
Because women still are denied membership in some clubs, they suffer a
(less pervasive and stigmatizing) form of one type of discrimination
African-Americans suffered during the Jim Crow era. If whites are not
free to exclude African-Americans from dining and other private social
establishments, why should men be able to exclude women? I would not
deny women the right to join clubs that still exclude them, but many
Americans, including a majority of the current members of the U.S.
Supreme Court, 170 likely believe that some men have an interest in
associating among themselves that outweighs some women's expressed
interest in associating with them, and with each other, in the facilities
167. Most forms of utilitarianism recognize limits to compromise. See Kuflik, supra note 35, at
44-48.
168. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,

STATE AND UTOPIA 26-35 (1974)

(rejecting

utilitarianism in favor of Kantian framework of individual rights).
169. See Amy Gutmann, How Not to Resolve Moral Conflicts in Politics, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 1, 12-14 (1999) (discussing, among other examples, consideration of race in university
admissions); see also Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Peace, supra note 10, at 1765-67 (discussing
limitations of legal rights frameworks in achieving social justice).
170. See N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1988) (upholding New
York City ordinance banning discrimination in clubs with more than 400 members, but recognizing
right to expressive association which entitles "distinctively private" clubs to exclude members based
upon gender and other factors).
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from which they currently are excluded. Many people still believe that
freedom to golf at Augusta National Golf Club or to join another
traditionally male club is not a baseline liberty that all women should
enjoy.
As Carrie Menkel-Meadow emphasizes, ours is a party-driven legal
system. 7 ' Parties initiate lawsuits as one approach to dealing with
conflict, and they ordinarily are free to terminate them. Where intense
and fundamental moral disagreement exists, it seems best to let the
parties determine when a judicial norm is needed-in other words, to let
them decide for themselves, as citizens immediately affected by a moral
dispute, or when they believe justice must be done. It seems best not
only from the perspective of the parties, but also from the public's
perspective. As Plessy v. Ferguson and other cases one could list
illustrate,' 72 U.S. Supreme Court decisions sometimes further entrench
social norms that are later widely considered to be repressive, making it
much more difficult to alter them, and the structures they maintain,
through political action. 73 The opportunity to create, reinforce or refine
a legal norm that a settled case presented is not lost forever, though some
cases, like Piscataway,undeniably present especially compelling factsfor better or worse, depending on one's perspective. If there is truly a
compelling need for a judge-made norm on a contested social issue,
however, another case that presents the issue is likely to emerge.
One might respond by arguing both that the U.S. Supreme Court is
frequently right, even if it is sometimes wrong, and that authoritative
legal norms reduce the intensity and costs of social conflict, regardless
of their rightness. 174 However, Gerald Rosenberg's empirical study of
the effects of decades of U.S. Supreme Court decision-making in the
areas of civil rights, abortion and women's rights, the environment,
reapportionment, and criminal law calls such claims into question.175
171. Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute?, supra note 10, at 2680. The party-driven nature of our
legal system is a product of the constitution's "cases and controversies" requirement. U.S. CONST.
art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1; see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
172. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896). Other notable examples include the
Dred Scott case, Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 421-23, 427 (1856) (holding that slaves and former
slaves were not citizens) and Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 206-07 (1927) (upholding Virginia statute
authorizing forced sterilization of detainees of mental health institutions who were found to be
"afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility, &c.").
173. Sinder, supra note 11, at 124.
174. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 9, at 2623 ("[Aldjudication may often prove superior to
settlement for securing peace because the former, unlike the latter, creates rules and precedents.").
175. See ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 337 (concluding, based upon empirical research, that
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Rosenberg's research suggests that "there is little evidence of. . . courts'
causal contributions" to social change in these areas, either as a result of
the direct effects of institutional change ordered by the Court or as a
result of the symbolic value of the Court's decisions. 176 ,
Whether or not one fully accepts Rosenberg's conclusions, most
would agree that the U.S. Supreme Court cannot make all citizens
177
instantly adopt, and behave in accordance with, its majority views.
This is unsurprising, particularly because the Court itself does not
always speak univocally. Deep differences of opinion persist within the
wider population after the Court presumably "resolves" a significant
policy question. We may respect the Court as a political institution, but
this respect does not deter us from protesting the Court's decisions
through whatever lawful means we can, including further litigation.
Rosenberg's research suggests that the Supreme Court never singlehandedly causes significant social reform. 7 8 Indeed, Rosenberg found
"[w]here there is local hostility to change, court orders will be ignored. Community pressure,
violence or threats of violence, and lack of market response all serve to curtail actions to implement
court decisions").
176. Id. at 8.
177. Some scholars critical of Rosenberg's work nonetheless agree with his narrow conclusion
that the court's rulings have little independent influence on behavior, let alone cause sweeping
social change. These scholars argue, however, that Rosenberg's approach is too "top-down" (i.e.,
focused on the court's role in producing social change) and positivist. Their own approaches to the
study of law and social change tend to be "bottom-up" and interpretivist, focusing, through case
studies and other qualitative empirical methods, on the role of law and litigation in the mobilization
of grass roots support for social reform movements and the reconstitution of identities and social
meaning. For an extended exchange regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Rosenberg's and
others' methodological approaches, see generally Michael W. McCann, Causal Versus Constitutive
Explanations (or, On the Difficulty of Being so Positive.. .), 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 457 (1996)
[hereinafter McCann, Explanations] (rejecting positive, causal explanations of the impact ofjudicial
decisions in favor of an interpretive approach that examines the thought and behavior of specific
political actors and groups in response to judicial decisions); McCann, supranote 70 (elaborating on
interpretive approach, discussing various methodological difficulties, and proposing directions for
future research); Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 715
(1992) [hereinafter McCann, Reform Litigation] (critiquing Rosenberg's methodology and
comparing it to interpretive approach); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hopes and Other Aspirations:
A Reply to Feeley and McCann, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 761 (1992) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Other
Aspirations] (responding to methodological and other critiques); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Knowledge
and Desire: Thinking About Courts and Social Change, in LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE
COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE 251 (David A. Schultz ed., 1998) [hereinafter Rosenberg,
Knowledge and Desire] (critiquing McCann study of pay equity reform movement on theoretical
and empirical grounds); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Positivism, Interpretivism, and the Study of Law, 21
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 435 (1996) (critiquing McCann study of pay equity reform movement on
theoretical and empirical grounds).
178. See ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 338; see also Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Peace, supra
note 10, at 1762 (observing that judicial rulings do not substantially change "the underlying social,

Settling Significant Cases
that the majority of Americans are unaware of the Court's decisions in
significant cases.179
Brown I and the second Brown v. Board of Education18 ° decision were
followed by years of inaction in some parts of the country, and,
ultimately, a cascade of further litigation.1 8' Rosenberg argues that
[t]he courts were ineffective in producing significant social
reform in civil rights in the first decade after Brown for three key
reasons ...First, political leadership at the national, state, and
local levels was arrayed against civil rights, making
implementation of judicial decisions virtually impossible. Second,
the culture of the South was segregationist, leaving the courts
with few public supporters ....Third, the American court system
itself was designed to lack implementation powers, to move
slowly, and to be strongly tied to local concerns. The presence of
these constraints made the success
of litigation for significant
182
social reform virtually impossible.
According to Rosenberg, while Brown I was reflective of growing social
disapproval of segregated education, the Court's desegregation policies
had very little practical effect until Congress and the executive branch
began to actively support and implement them.'83
Rosenberg's conclusions obviously do not suggest that the Court can
play no meaningful role in social reform, and Rosenberg himself would

economic or political relations between the parties .....
179. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 338.

180. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown I].
181. See ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 42-57. Indeed, some prominent African-American civil
rights scholars now question whether desegregating schools has done more harm than good for
African-Americans, despite the role the Brown decisions played in eliminating segregation in other
social institutions. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 160-79 (2004) (arguing that resource disparities,
pervasive racism, and other factors, rather than segregation, disadvantage African-American
students); CHARLES J.OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF
CENTURY OF BROWN V.BOARD OFEDUCATION267-69, 30243 (2004) (discussing author's effort to

establish a charter school for African Americans and advocating education reform as responses to
unmet promises of Brown decisions).
182. See ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 93. Rosenberg contends that three constraints limit the
Court's ability to produce social change: the Court's authority is limited by the Constitution and
existing precedent; the Court's dependence upon political support to effect change; and lack of
effective, autonomous means for implementing its decisions. Id. at 336-37. He argues that the Court
can produce significant social reform when some or all of these constraints are overcome as a result
of the existence of sufficient political and/or social support for change. Id. at 10-36.
183. Id. at 105-06.
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not support that position. 184 The Court may be incapable of mandating
broad acceptance of norms it sanctions, but it no doubt does contribute
to the process of social change, which, of course, is highly recursive.
Federal and state courts, Congress and state legislatures, and federal,
state, and local executives and executive agencies are constantly
engaged in what can be thought of as a "meta-dialog" on significant
social issues-a dialog generated and informed by cooperation and
conflict among activists, community groups, and other individuals and
groups.
While the U.S. Supreme Court may be incapable of instantly
changing the behavior of millions, its holdings add to an array of social
processes that contribute to the ongoing development of social norms.
The Court invalidates a regulation; the agency responsible for its
administration modifies it, but not enough to avert further litigation.
Congress legislates around a Supreme Court ruling, only to find the new
legislation challenged in court. 185 Social change surrounding divisive
issues occurs gradually with inputs coming from many agents and many
angles, and litigation before the nation's courts no doubt plays a very
significant role. If, as Rosenberg concluded, Supreme Court rulings are
never independent causes of social change, they are likely contributing
factors in a larger chain of causal events.186 While only a minority of
citizens may follow the activities of the Supreme Court, the policies,
strategies and activities of those who do-activists, lawyers, educators,
politicians and other social elites-are informed and influenced by the
Court's rulings. Law surely influences and informs social norms and
social meaning, even when changes87in law do not immediately cause
broad, corresponding social change. 1
184. See Rosenberg, Knowledge and Desire, supra note 177, at 254 ("The Hollow Hope is often
misinterpreted as arguing that courts are irrelevant to social change and that court decisions have no
impact on society.")
185. For example, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb to bb-4 (2000), following the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect Native
Americans who use illegal drugs in religious ceremonies), but the Supreme Court later held the Act
to be unconstitutional. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
186. See McCann, Explanations,supra note 177, at 459-66 (arguing that the positive model of
the Court's causal contributions to social change neglects or undervalues a host of contingent
aspects of human social behavior that are influenced by law and legal struggle before the Court).
But see Rosenberg, Knowledge and Desire, supra note 177, at 279-80 (noting that research for his
book THE HOLLOW HOPE produced no evidence that the Court's decisions independently changed
citizens' beliefs or enabled activists to build support for their causes).
187. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943

Settling Significant Cases
Within the constrained view of the Court's ability to catalyze social
change presented by Rosenberg, however, one of the major rewards
arguably sought by at least one party to a significant case-social
change mandated by the Court's decision-appears very speculative.' 88
For this reason, one may legitimately question, as does Rosenberg,
whether reformers are justified in expending scarce resources on a
potential contributor to social change that can be expected to produce
uncertain results even if it is facially successful. 189 From the public's
perspective, the Court's decisions also appear less likely to dampen
social conflict or reduce its costs, because parties that the courts leave
disappointed frequently register their ongoing protests through further
litigation.
The point is not that the Court is impotent; the point is simply that it
is less potent than many parties and members of the public likely
assume. "Law is created against a pre-existing set of background norms
and affects those norms in complex ways," as Eric Posner explains.' 90
"Even if people do not like a particular [state of behavioral] equilibrium
[produced by prevailing norms], it is never clear that legal intervention
will improve the situation .... [I]ncremental changes in the law may fail
to change behavior or may cause massive and unpredictable cascades,
frustrating efforts to use the law to fine-tune people's actions. ' 191 Posner
concludes that, "[1]egal regulation, done poorly, will produce fewer
gains than communal regulation [through the ongoing development of

(1995) (examining reciprocal relationship between changes in law and changes in social meanings
underlying social norms).
188. Feeley suggests that activist litigants and lawyers do not really believe that a victory in court
will alone produce desired social change, and therefore do not litigate with that hope. Feeley, supra
note 68, at 749 (suggesting reformers make exaggerated claims about the court's efficacy).
Rosenberg persuasively refutes this argument. See Rosenberg, OtherAspirations,supra note 177, at
763-64.
189. See Rosenberg, Knowledge and Desire, supra note 177, at 258, 278-80. Just as Rosenberg
seeks to encourage reform-minded litigators to adopt nonadjudicative unilateral strategies (e.g.,
lobbying) for achieving social change when conditions for overcoming the constraints on the
Court's ability to contribute to it are absent, I seek to encourage both those who seek reform and
those who oppose it to consider utilizing an altemative to adjudicative and nonadjudicative
unilateral strategies of engagement, i.e., consensual approaches to dealing with social conflict.
190. POSNER, supra note 69, at 4.
191. Id. at 176; see also McCann, supra note 70, at 336-37 (discussing the complexity and
unpredictability of changes in perspective and behavior resulting from changes in law); Laurence H.
Tribe, The Curvature of ConstitutionalSpace: What Lawyers Can Learnfrom Modern Physics, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1, 28 (1989) (arguing that, paradoxically, school desegregation cases created
impediments to desegregation).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 79:881, 2004

192

social norms]."
Rosenberg's research suggests that, when the Court does contribute to
social change, its "contribution... is akin to officially recognizing the
evolving state of affairs, more like the cutting of the ribbon on a new
project than its construction."1' 93 If Rosenberg is right, then it is difficult
to justify a blanket preference for seeking the Supreme Court's
perspective on each matter of deep public significance at the earliest
possible moment. Furthermore, if social conflict resists the parties' most
strenuous efforts to resolve it through litigation, perhaps litigation
sometimes perpetuates social conflict, rather than helping to resolve it.
From the public's perspective, a major potential benefit of strategic
settlement is, in a sense, delay--delay and a winnowing of the number
of cases brought before the Supreme Court for resolution. Only failed
1 94
settlement efforts can tell us how urgently a legal norm is needed.
With time, the issues brought before the Court may be further refined,
and the perspective of one of the parties (or yet another perspective) on
the issues may come to predominate, so that creation of a legal norm
becomes unnecessary or a subsequent Supreme Court decision on the
matter, to the extent it is consistent with the emerging consensus, may be
more widely accepted. Because judge-made law is created by a very
small number of public officials (i.e., the trial and appellate judges who
hear cases) in response to issues framed by as few as two individuals,
and because judicial decisions typically go unchecked by the other
branches of government, judge-made
law should, in my view, be created
95
cautiously and sparingly. 1
If this argument seems blas6-indifferent to the morally charged
192. POSNER, supra note 69, at 220.
193. See ROSENBERG, supranote 18, at 338.
194. Furthermore, producing legal norms at a feverish rate would not necessarily be a good thing.
As David Luban admits, "our rapidly expanding legal system cannot tolerate a greatly accelerated
adjudication rate because of the confusion and bad law that would result." Luban, supra note 9, at
2620; see also Coleman & Silver, supra note 13, at 117-18 (arguing that reaffirmation of wellestablished legal precedents is wasteful).
195. For arguments (from different points on the political spectrum) favoring the abolition or
limitation of judicial review on the basis that the judiciary is an inherently contermajoritarian
institution, see, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM

AND AMERICAN DECLINE 317-30 (1996) (blaming perceived cultural decay, in part, on
antidemocratic decisions of judiciary); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM AT THE SUPREME COURT 24-45 (1999) (advocating judicial restraint and arguing that

it promotes a deliberative conception of democracy); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS 174 (1999) (advocating abolition of judicial review on grounds that it
would "distribute constitutional responsibility throughout the population").

Settling Significant Cases
nature of the types of disputes that produce significant cases and the
urgent priorities and needs of the litigants and others for whom they
serve as proxies-consider that both parties in the scenario I am
describing prefer settlement to continued litigation. Even if an absence
of controlling precedent means the parties are not bargaining in the
shadow of the law, they are at least bargaining in the shadow of the
adjudicative process. 196 As indicated above, my perspective regarding
settlement of significant cases is contingent upon the existence of
adjudication as an alternative to settlement. Consider also that another
party may bring the same issue before the Court at a later date. Finally,
consider the potential social costs of a "wrong" decision when compared
to the potential social benefits of a "right" decision that is too far ahead
of an evolving public consensus. Given the relatively slow rate of
attrition among the justices of the Supreme Court and the Court's
reluctance to overturn itself, decisions that affirm existing legal norms
may impede social change by revalidating those norms and extending
their political "half lives," whereas decisions that disrupt existing legal
norms may have little power to effect immediate social change.
Another potential cost of settlement is diminution of the skill and
experience of courts and litigators in ushering disputants through the
adjudicative process, particularly its advanced stages (i.e., trial and
appeal). 197 While this point may seem like a bad joke to anyone who
believes we live in an overly litigious society, there can be no doubt that
fewer trials and appeals mean fewer opportunities for lawyers to acquire
and develop the skills necessary to help citizens address their grievances
through litigation when necessary. A well-functioning justice system is
an important public good. My arguments about the comparative benefits
of settlement are not intended to suggest otherwise; indeed, they are
dependent upon the existence of adjudication as a meaningful alternative
to settlement.
There seem to me to be two principal-and persuasive-responses to
this concern. First, I seriously doubt that strategic settlement of
significant cases will occur at such a dramatic rate as to inhibit the
development of litigation skills among the lawyers who handle these
types of cases or judging skills within the courts that hear them.
196. Marc Galanter aptly calls the process by which most lawsuits get resolved "litigotiation."
Marc Galanter, World of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 268, 268 (1984).
197. See Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication
on LitigatingLawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833, 837 (1990).
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Significant cases likely represent a small fraction of all pending
litigation, and judges seldom complain about a paucity of cases on their
dockets. Furthermore, significant cases that reach the U.S. Supreme
Court (or have a real prospect of reaching it) are seldom settled for
purely strategic reasons, and probably seldom will be in the future.
Strategic settlement is most likely to occur when the case was initiated in
a clearly unfavorable climate (i.e., the plaintiffs lawyers arguably made
a serious tactical error) or the climate, though ambiguous when the suit
was initiated, has become clearly unfavorable (e.g., the Supreme Court
recently has denied certiorari on an unfavorable appellate court ruling in
another circuit). At the U.S. Supreme Court level, examples of strategic
settlement like Piscataway are relatively rare no doubt because these
conditions are rare. 198 For these reasons, it seems unlikely that
significant cases will settle for strategic reasons so frequently that
lawyers and judges become incapable of trying them.
Second, even though litigation allows lawyers to hone certain types of
advocacy skills, it tends to inhibit the development of problem-solving
skills among the parties themselves. Citizens' recourse to lawyers and
courts often signals their lack of capacity to solve their problem
constructively without the coercive intervention of a third party. Given a
choice between development of the skills of lawyers and judges in
managing the (coercive) process of adjudication, on the one hand, and
development of the parties' own (consensual) problem solving skills, on
the other, I believe the latter choice is better for society as a whole. 199
This is a key theme of the next subpart, which examines the costs and
benefits of settlements resulting from deliberative processes that produce
some degree of perspective change among the parties.
B.

MoralDeliberation

When parties to a significant case are willing to engage in a process
through which they examine their own values and commitments or
198. On the other hand, purposefully commencing litigation with the expectation of settling it
strategically may be an effective approach to achieving incremental progress in an unfavorable
political climate. See McCann, Reform Litigation, supra note 177, at 737-39 (arguing that evidence

from case studies and interviews of participants in pay equity movement demonstrates that litigation
played an important role in extracting concessions through negotiation with employers, even though
the movement met with little success in cases that were litigated to judgment).
199. In fact, like Menkel-Meadow, I also believe every lawyer's repertoire should be broadened
to include collaborative problem solving skills. See Menkel-Meadow, Litigation, supra note 10, at
59-61; Menkel-Meadow, PursuingPeace,supra note 10, at 1763-65.

Settling Significant Cases
explore the potential for cooperation on practical matters despite their
conflicting values, a settlement born of perspective change may emerge.
As Lon Fuller observed long ago with respect to mediation, its
central quality... [is] ...its capacity to reorient the parties
toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by
helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their
relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and
dispositions toward one another.2 °0
Fuller's view of mediation is highly idealized, and not all mediators and
facilitators strive for the "new and shared perceptions" that Fuller sees as
the principal byproduct of mediation or have the knowledge and skill to
craft processes likely to produce perspective change when it is an
explicit or implicit goal. 20 1 Nonetheless, skilled neutrals are capable of
structuring processes that increase the likelihood that perspective change
will occur, typically over multiple sessions spanning a significant length
of time. When perspective change does occur, any potential settlement
discussed by the parties, will, like a strategic settlement, have both
benefits and costs for the parties and society.
1.

PotentialCosts and Benefits to the Disputants

In an insightful article that explores the moral and democratic value
of settlement generally, Carrie Menkel-Meadow catalogs many of the
benefits parties may realize when they settle a case, rather than
continuing to litigate. 2 These potential benefits apply equally to
ordinary and significant cases. They include:
(1) Party autonomy with respect to both process and outcome, a
feature that furthers the goals of democracy whenever
settlements are the product of genuine consent;
(2) A wider range of possible outcomes that may better serve the
parties' needs and preferences;
(3) The ability to express "a moral commitment to equality,
precision in justice, accommodation, and peaceful
coexistence of conflicting interests ' 20 3 through compromise.
200. Fuller, Mediation, supranote 11,at 325.
201. On the variety of approaches to mediation and their diverse methods and objectives, see
generally Leonard L. Riskin, UnderstandingMediators' Orientations,Strategies and Techniques: A
Gridfor the Perplexed, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996).

202. Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute?,supra note 10, at 2692.
203. Id.
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(4) The ability to express fidelity to non-legal norms and
principles through the terms of settlement, rather than
resolving the dispute solely with reference to norms that have
been embodied in law;
(5) A richer and more humane opportunity for participation than
one ordinarily experiences in adjudicative processes,
including greater potential for cathartic, educational, and
other transformative moments;
(6) A greater ability to accommodate the values, needs and
preferences of multiple stakeholders; and
(7) The exchange of more and different types of information that
shed new light on the dispute and facilitate problem solving.
A further potential benefit can be added to this list when the dispute
settled is the type that gives rise to a significant case. The parties may
experience both satisfaction and personal growth from participating in a
process that they hope will contribute to a more integrative form of
social change, even if they also experience some anxiety about their
decision. °4
As with strategic settlements, the principal costs of settlements
resulting from genuine moral deliberation are opportunity costs and
signaling costs, though each takes on a somewhat different character in
this context. When parties settle a significant case primarily for strategic
reasons, they do not intend the terms of their agreement to be a partial or
complete substitute for the legal norm they hoped to establish or reaffirm
through litigation. There is no mutual acknowledgement of others'
perspectives, however incomplete or imperfect that acknowledgement
may be, when a significant case is settled. The parties merely call a truce
in what they assume will be an ongoing social struggle.
In contrast, settlements resulting from collective moral deliberation
are intended to resolve the underlying dispute or some aspect of it, or to
achieve incremental progress toward the dispute's ultimate resolution.
One forgoes or postpones the chance to establish or reinforce a legal
norm aligned with one's values, and the ancillary benefits that one hopes
would flow from it, in return for an agreement that represents a partial
advancement or preservation of the substantive values one had hoped
could be advanced or preserved more completely through litigation. One
also may forgo the opportunity for more complete retribution for, or

204. See Kuflik, supra note 35, at 51 (arguing that participation in sincere dialogue is an intrinsic
good).
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public vindication of, past harms.2 °5
The opportunity costs incurred when a settlement of a U.S. Supreme
Court case results from moral deliberation are greater than those
incurred through a strategic settlement, because the parties' respective
investments in cooperative (or at least non-hostile) activities is greater.
When a strategic settlement occurs, the primary motivation of at least
one of the parties is fear of defeat in litigation. That party intends to
carry on the fight in different forums, or to support others similarly
situated in their fights before the Court once the political winds have
shifted or the Court has been reconstituted. When a settlement results
from genuine moral deliberation, the parties are, in a sense, giving up the
fight-or, rather, electing to re-channel at least some of the energy they
were investing in it. The settlement, and whatever activities or
constraints flow from it, becomes a primary strategy for promoting one's
values going forward.
As with strategic settlements, parties elect to incur the opportunity
costs associated with terminating litigation-or, where litigation has not
yet commenced, of foreclosing it as an option-because they believe the
benefits of settlement outweigh these costs. A settlement based on some
measure of genuine perspective change may in fact provide each party
more of what it wants than would success in court, particularly in light
of the risk that a favorable outcome in litigation may not produce real
social change where political will is lacking. It also may create a
foundation for ongoing cooperation by the parties that delivers further
benefits to each over time. Litigants who do not settle may rationalize
the risk of loss by viewing the possible setback as temporary-a step on
the path to ultimate victory, and therefore not truly a compromise of the
value they seek to defend. While their commitment to that value may
remain absolute, however, the value itself has no legal force following a
decisive loss in litigation. Through settlement, the loser's values would
have become at least partially actualized, and further activism and
cooperation might produce further, incremental improvements-and,
perhaps ultimately, conditions in which one's cherished value becomes
as fully actualized as one hoped it would through litigation.
Signaling costs also assume a different character in the context of
205. However, as Martha Minow explains in the context of political settlements in the wake of
mass violence, settlements sometimes can address the desire for retribution and public vindication
through remedies such as truth commissions and reparations. MARTHA MINOw, BETWEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 52-117

(1998).
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settlements resulting from genuine moral deliberation. A settlement of a
significant case that has a cooperative or value-integrating dimension is
more likely to be viewed as betrayal of one's cohorts or even a defection
from the group. Furthermore, a settlement in which a significant number
of members of a social group participate, or which is supported by a
significant number of a group's members, may threaten the group's
cohesion and disrupt established identities. When one defends one's
values, one also defends one's identity, both as an individual and as a
member of any group to which those values are central.2 °6 Exposing
one's values to genuine inquiry and potential transformation may alter
our current self-perceptions, others' perceptions of us, and even others'
perceptions of themselves.
The risk that settlement presents to the stability of social groups
simply underscores the extent to which most social groups are not
monolithic in terms of their members' value orientations, needs, and
preferences. Litigation tends to mask divisions within interest groups,
leaving internal differences unexamined and unchallenged, because legal
argumentation is dialectical. Advocates representing groups in conflict
typically make polarized arguments that leave little room for ambiguity
and admit few exceptions (or at least do not admit the claim made by
one's opponent as an exception). In contrast, settlement processes
designed to produce perspective change may destabilize groups by
permitting expression of alternate viewpoints, thereby forcing the groups
to confront internal diversity and inconsistencies. In ideological
conflicts, competing groups frequently have both hawkish and dove-like
members. 207 As Robinson an
and his colleagues found, a substantial number
of the members of an identity group likely believe that they privately
hold views that are more moderate than those held by the average
member of the group.20 8
Social psychologist Herbert Kelman argues that the development of
coalitions across conflict lines is critical to the resolution of deep-seated
206. For a general discussion regarding the construction and defense of individual and group
identity, including the role of values, see GLYNIS M. BREAKWELL, COPING WITH THREATENED
IDENTITIES 98-100 (1986) (discussing the construction and defense of individual and group
identity, including the role of values).
207. See generally Herbert C. Kelman, Coalitions Across Conflict Lines: The Interplay of
Conflicts Within and Between the Israeli and PalestinianCommunities, in CONFLICTS BETWEEN

PEOPLE AND GROUPS 236 (S. Worchel & J.A. Simpson eds., 1993) (considering ways in which
constructive interactions between pro-negotiation factions within conflicting groups can influence
group members who oppose negotiation and reconciliation).
208. Robinson, supra note 108, at 414.
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social conflict. 20 9 Peaceful social change ultimately requires the
progressive transformation of relationships within identity groups, as
well as relations between them. As Kelman explains, conciliatory
interactions between members of opposing groups help promote intragroup change as well as inter-group change, provided those who
participate in the interactions maintain sufficient credibility within their
own groups. 210 It seems reasonable to assume, for example, that
moderate white citizens' experiences interacting with blacks during the
civil rights era played a role in transforming other white citizens'
perspectives on racial issues. Conflict resolution practitioners often
employ informal, nonbonding dialog processes in an effort to develop
coalitions between members of opposing groups, in the hope that these
interactions might eventually promote such intra-group change, creating
the conditions from which informal cooperation and formal agreements
between groups can emerge. 211 Indeed, it is in all groups' interests to
produce an agreement that their more extreme members can minimally
support; otherwise, the agreement is unlikely to prove durable.
Public settlements-formal or informal agreements that involve some
level of coordinated action or inaction-impose signaling costs on those
who participate in them. As with opportunity costs, however,
participants in settlements accept them because they believe the
cumulative costs of foregoing litigation are outweighed by the
cumulative benefits of cooperation. Those who incur these costs alter the
social environment in a way that may decrease the signaling costs for
those who later elect to cooperate with members of opposing groups. In
other words, a settlement may sometimes provide social "cover" in the
same way that a U.S. Supreme Court ruling can. By affirming the equal
rights and dignity of black citizens, the Supreme Court's landmark civil
rights decisions no doubt lowered the potential reputational costs
incurred by whites inclined to express non-racist perspectives among
whites who continued to hold racist views, or whose views were
undisclosed. As Robinson and his colleagues observe, when one sees
other members of one's group expressing perspectives widely thought
to
212
be taboo, it becomes easier to express those perspectives oneself.
Before concluding this Part, I wish to return briefly to Fiss's principal

209. See Kelman, supra note 207, at 254.
210. Id. at 240-42.
211. Id. at 238-39.
212. See Robinson, supra note 108, at 416.
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objections to settlement of significant cases. Of the four types of
significant cases identified by Fiss, I believe three can be viewed as
expressions of skepticism about whether mutually beneficial settlements
of the fourth type of case are truly achievable. Expressed in simple
terms, Fiss's list of significant cases comprises those involving (1)
significant power imbalances between the parties, (2) representational
complexities, (3) enforcement complexities, or (4) differences in deeply
held values.2 13 While each of these characteristics may exist
independently of the others, I believe cases that arise from differences in
deeply held values frequently exhibit one or more of the other
characteristics. When this is true, the presence of one or more of the
other characteristics amplifies questions about whether it is possible to
do justice through settlement.2 14 From Fiss's perspective, judges ensure
that justice is done not only by making authoritative declarations of law,
but by producing their declarations through a process that Fiss believes
ensures that weaker parties are treated fairly; the interests of those
affected by the outcome but not participating in the process directly are
protected; and the obligations resulting from the Court's judgment are
actually performed. An authoritative declaration of law would be
morally suspect, of little practical consequence, or both if any of the
latter three conditions were absent.
Power imbalances, which may be partially generated by existing legal
norms, will often affect the terms of a settlement. Assuming the weaker
individual or group is adequately represented, however, I would not
interfere with the parties' decision to settle, even if I objected to the
terms. Adequate representation may come in the form of strong and
determined members of social groups that are at odds with one another,
competent counsel, or a combination of the two. Strong individuals at
the vanguard of a group's cause typically are the protagonists in disputes
that give rise to significant cases, and the plaintiffs (or plaintiffs chief
supporters) in any litigation that ensues. Their lawyers can be extremely

213. Fiss, supra note 2, at 1087.
214. I realize that Fiss demands a separate justification for settlement of each type of case. The
bulk of this article is my effort to provide that justification with respect to his fourth type of case,
those that he views as requiring an authoritative interpretation of law. Id. The present discussion is a
minimal effort to justify settlement where the other three characteristics are present. As indicated
above, I give less attention to these characteristics because they have received sustained attention by
many others and because I consider Fiss' objections to settlement of cases where he believes an
authoritative interpretation of law is required to be his most powerful line of argument against
settlement.
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capable and vigorous advocates.215 If these people believe perspective
change significant enough to create a foundation for improved social
relations has occurred, why should their decision not be respected,
especially because they have litigation as an alternative and those
similarly situated individuals who are not participants in the settlement
remain free to initiate a lawsuit if they disapprove of the settlement?
Many join Fiss in expressing concern about negotiation's potential for
disempowerment of members of minority groups, women, the poor, and
members of other socially disadvantaged groups when compared to
litigation.2 1 6 While this risk is real, it is minimized significantly in any
well-facilitated deliberative process-perhaps minimized to the point
that the risk of disempowerment is less than that which weaker
individuals face in court. One role of the facilitator(s) of any wellmanaged deliberative process is to ensure that participants have equal
critically about a proposed
voice and that all parties have thought
217
agreement before they consent to it.
Other scholars see the ways in which well-facilitated consensual
processes actually can be empowering for those who participate in them,
including members of disadvantaged groups.2 1 8 The participants, who
typically would be heard relatively little during a trial and not at all upon
appeal, are encouraged by facilitators to contribute to the dialogue.
Indeed, skilled facilitators endeavor to structure and conduct deliberative
215. Mark Tushnet's account of Thurgood Marshall's decades-long campaign against racial
discrimination on behalf of the NAACP provides a forceful example. See MARK V. TUSHNET,
MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961
(1994).
216. See Menkel-Meadow, Litigation, supra note 10, at 57. Mediators with a "transformative"
orientation are especially conscious about seizing opportunities for party empowerment. See
ROBERT BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO
CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 85-89 (1994). For a discussion of some of

the potential limitations and challenges of achieving this goal, see Jeffrey R. Seul, How
Transformative is Transformative Mediation?:A Constructive-DevelopmentalAssessment, 15 OHIO
ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 135, 157-67 (1999).

217. See generally Michael L. Poirier Elliott, The Role of Facilitators,Mediators, and Other
Consensus Building Practitioners,in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 199 (Lawerence Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (discussing roles of

neutral third parties in consensus-based dispute resolution processes).
218. See, e.g., Linda Singer et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Poor, Part k What
ADR Processes Exist and Why Advocates Should Become Involved, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 142,

152-53 (1992) (arguing that consensual dispute resolution processes often present improved
opportunities for problem solving in disputes involving the poor); Linda Singer et al., Alternative
Dispute Resolution and the Poor, Part II: Dealing with Problems in Using ADR and Choosing a
Process, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 288, 290 (1992) (same).
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processes in ways that make it safe for participants to speak openly and
honestly. 219 Participants acquire new information about their adversaries
and themselves that will inform, and may transform, their own
perspectives, interests and objectives, empowering them to make better
decisions about how to achieve their objectives in the dispute, whether
through settlement, litigation, or some other form of social action. With
litigation as an ever-present alternative to settlement, it is very difficult
to see how a well-facilitated deliberative process can disempower those
who participate in it.
Problems of representation and generation of authoritative consent
arguably are greater in litigation than in settlement. If adequacy of
representation and consent are values that Fiss and others wish our
justice system to promote, then, on several levels, litigation serves them
less well than consensual dispute resolution processes. In the context of
significant cases, small panels of judges establish norms on highly
divisive issues that are binding upon citizens generally, the vast majority
of whom will have had no meaningful voice in the litigation and no
opportunity to consent. Furthermore, interest groups that supposedly are
litigation-whether
to
the
parties
through
represented
African-Americans, abortion opponents, evangelical Christians, or
Libertarians-are seldom monolithic in their views. 220 Litigants often
purport to express the unified perspective of groups that, in fact, are
often internally heterogeneous. As discussed above, they often frame
issues in polarized ways that fail to capture the full range of perspectives
on a moral problem that are held by the group's members. Deliberative
processes typically can be structured to make room for expression of a
range of perspectives, including the divergent perspectives held by
members of a single social group. The outcomes they produce typically
do not bind those who have not consented.2 21
Fiss's claim that the need for ongoing court supervision and
219. See, e.g., Richard Chasin et al., From Diatribe to Dialogue on Divisive Public Issues:
Approaches Drawnfrom Family Therapy, 13 MEDIATION Q. 323, 331-37 (1996) (discussing efforts
made to prevent reenactment of the conflict in dialogue process and to promote expression of
previously unexpressed feelings and perspectives); LeBaron & Carstarphen, supra note 139, at 1031
(discussing the importance of ground rules for creating a safe environment).
220. Some of the problems generated by the presence of pluralistic parties in negotiations are
addressed in RAIFFA, SCIENCE AND ART, supra note 137, at 465-83.
221. Luban demonstrates that some settlements nonetheless produce negative externalities,
shifting costs to parties who were unrepresented in the process. See Luban, supra note 35, at 40405. This possibility is the main reason well-designed deliberative processes include representatives
of the broadest possible range of stakeholders.
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enforcement following resolution of some types of disputes cannot be
addressed through settlement is also questionable. Fiss is primarily
concerned with institutional reform litigation-cases that are frequently
resolved by consent decrees that contemplate the Court's continued
involvement in the implementation of their terms.222 There is no reason
why courts cannot play a role in the post-settlement relations among
parties to other types of significant cases when the parties see advantage
in the Court's continued involvement.2 23 For example, had the parties in
the abortion clinic buffer zone case discussed in the introduction to this
Article agreed that groups opposing abortion would limit their protest
activities outside health care facilities in specified ways if the health care
facilities provided women considering an abortion with literature that
presents cautionary perspectives, they could have asked the Court to
enter their agreement as a consent decree and to monitor their
compliance with it.
In sum, if parties to a significant case achieve a measure of genuine
perspective change and wish to settle their case as a result, I believe that
decision is entirely legitimate-provided, as explained below, 224 that

basic liberties and opportunities are protected. Social conflict is at least
partially a product of conflicting values and meanings. When parties feel
that previously conflicting values and meanings have been brought into
sufficient harmony (or at least sufficiently constructive tension) that, on
balance, there are more grounds for cooperation than for continued
conflict, there is no reason to expect or encourage the parties to continue
to litigate. I may personally disagree with the parties' decision, and I
may even speak or act in protest of it, but I would not deprive them of
their ability to decide. Responding to Fiss's and Luban's opposition to
settlement in defense of the undifferentiated interests of an abstract
public, Menkel-Meadow asks rhetorically, "Whose dispute is it
anyway? ' 225 Particular individuals and groups suffer discrete or
generalized harms, and litigation is one way they may voice their
grievances. Deliberative processes enable these individuals and groups
222. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds 58-60 (April 16, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(concluding, based upon extensive case analysis, that institutional reform cases frequently are
settled).
223. This, of course, is one of the contemporary roles of courts, as Chayes was first to observe.
Chayes, supra note 1l, at 1298-1302.
224. See infra Part V.
225. Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute?,supra note 10, at 2663.
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to choose for themselves between the state of affairs that a given
settlement promises and the state of affairs that might eventually exist
after obtaining a judgment in their favor.
2.

PotentialSocial Costs and Benefits

As with strategic settlement, there are at least two principal costs,
from the public's perspective, of a settlement resulting from genuine
moral deliberation. The first is the missed opportunity to create,
reinforce, or refine a legal norm. The second cost is the lost
opportunities for courts and lawyers to enhance their skills at processing
disputes through adjudication. These costs are discussed at length
above, 6 so I will not repeat that discussion here.
These costs of settlement must be assessed in light of the costs of
litigating significant cases, of which I believe one particularly stands out.
Because parties currently turn to adjudication to address their moral
disagreements so frequently and so quickly, our society's capacity for
problem-solving, among both citizens and their representatives (i.e.,
those who advocate their causes and public officials), arguably is not as
robust as it could be.227 I believe that compulsively litigating the types of
disputes that give rise to significant cases all the way to a supposedly
definitive judicial "resolution" inhibits the development of our capacity
to manage our toughest problems. Disputes present opportunities to
build social capital.228 When we litigate conflicts, we undertake our most
difficult conversations in a way that is overly mediated-mediated, that
is, through the impersonal strictures of the judicial process, where our
primary conversation partner is the Court-rather than having these
conversations directly with other affected parties, or with minimal
mediation among the parties, through a facilitated, non-binding
negotiation process. As a result, we practice a weaker form of
democracy than we otherwise could.
From this perspective, a trial of a significant case is a failure, 229 and a
226. See supra Part lV.A.2.
227. See Sinder, supra note 11, at 124.
228. See Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for
Community, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 27, 45-53 (2002). The concept of social capitalconnections between individuals that are fundamental to the health of civil society-is discussed in
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY
15-28 (2000).
229. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and
the Selection of Casesfor Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (calling a trial a failure).
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settlement resulting from genuine moral deliberation is a sign of
democratic health. As Riley Sinder, John Lopker and Ronald Heifitz
have argued, if we require the judiciary to dispense answers and
corrective remedies where authoritative texts do not clearly supply them,
the judiciary may stifle the democratic process and retard social
progress.230 As they explain, "the Court's issuance of a technical
decision balancing rights and interests may merely perpetuate [social]
work avoidance by establishing the next judicial battleground in which
adamant perceptions of self-interest will compete. 23'
By contrast, the primary potential social benefits of settling a
significant case through a process of genuine moral deliberation are the
development of citizens' capacity to manage their most difficult
conflicts more constructively, the strengthening of social bonds, and, of
course, the meaningful, substantive contributions to social change that
may result from the settlement. In the next Part, I describe how the
promise of collective moral deliberation may be realized in the context
of settlement of significant cases.
V.

SETTLEMENT AND THE PRACTICE OF DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY

The capacity for social problem solving is a key feature of what
Benjamin Barber calls "strong democracy." 2 32 As he explains, "[w]here
weak democracy eliminates conflict. . . , represses it.... or tolerates
it ....strong democracy transforms conflict., 233 One form of weak
democracy identified by Barber is what he calls "juridicial democracy,"
in which social conflict is resolved "through deferring to a
representativejudicial elite., 234 Barber's notion of strong democracy is
an expression of what Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson and other
political theorists call deliberative democracy.2 35 From a deliberative
perspective, the goal of democracy is the transformation of political

230. See Sinder, supra note 11, at 124; see also Kuflik, supra note 35, at 50 (arguing that
"controversy is sometimes more to be welcomed than lamented, for itcan become the occasion for
persons to broaden their perspectives and enlarge their understanding").
231. See Sinder, supra-note 11, at 124.
232. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE

151 (1984).
233. Id. (emphasis in original).
234. Id. at 142 (emphasis in original).
235. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 1.
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preferences through rational dialogue, rather than the mere aggregation
of preferences through bargaining or voting.236 Transformation of
preferences is synonymous with what I refer to in this Article as
perspective change. Settlement processes that create opportunities for
perspective change through collective moral deliberation can be
important forums for democratic participation.
A key tenet of deliberative democracy is that "political choice, to be
legitimate, must be the outcome of [collective] deliberation about ends
[as well as means]. 2 37 Theorists differ on the extent to which wellconstructed deliberative processes ensure the moral integrity of the
outcomes they produce. At one end of the spectrum is Jiirgen Habermas,
who posits an ideal discursive process from which, he argues, morally
justifiable decisions necessarily follow. 238 At the other end are Gutmann
and Thompson.2 39 While they believe that deliberative processes which
satisfy specified conditions are likely to produce outcomes that are
morally sound rather than just politically expedient, they argue that an
outcome is not morally acceptable if it denies any party certain basic
liberties and opportunities. 240 I consider the differences in these
perspectives in the discussion of moral relativism that follows in Part
VI.A. The key point for present purposes is that the negotiation
processes imagined by deliberative democrats involve moral deliberation
about practical alternatives, not brute bargaining over them.241
Reason giving is the core practice of deliberative democracy. As
Gutmann and Thompson explain, from a deliberative perspective, "when
citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to
reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions. 2 42 Gutmann,
like Barber, advises disputants to "avoid taking a moral conflict to court
243
if possible.,
236. Jon Elster, Introduction, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 8, 1 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
237. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
238. See infra note 303 and accompanying text.
239. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supranote 61, at 17-18.

240. Id.
241. The form of negotiation that leads to strategic settlement is what proponents of deliberative
democracy and some legal scholars, such as Duncan Kennedy, call bargaining. The form of
negotiation that produces perspective change regarding the nature of a dispute and the possibilities
for its resolution is what proponents of deliberative democracy call deliberation and what Kennedy
calls dialogue. See KENNEDY, supra note 22, at 43-44 (comparing dialogue and bargaining); see
also GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 55-63 (comparing deliberation and bargaining).
242. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at I.
243. Gutmann, supra note 169, at 1.
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Deliberation lies somewhere between bargaining (i.e., compromise
with a focus on interests) and arguing (i.e., trying to persuade others to
abandon their own reasons in favor of one's own), and involves elements
of both.244 Deliberative outcomes must be supported by "reasons that are
recognizably moral in form and mutually acceptable in content. 245 One
party need not be converted to another's perspective, but each party must
be able to acknowledge that every other party is defending a legitimate
moral value.246
Dialogue of this quality is not easy to achieve. It requires an
uncommon degree of openness to others' perspectives and demonstrated
respect for those with whom one fundamentally disagrees. 247 All
participants in a truly deliberative process must be genuinely "motivated
to find reasons that can be accepted by others. 24 8 One of the key
characteristics that distinguishes deliberation from pure
bargaining is the
249
attitude with which participants engage in the process.
Deliberative processes need not, however, be completely free of

244. Diego Gambetta, "Claro!". An Essay in Discursive Machismo, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY 19, 19 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
245. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 57.
246. Theodore Benditt argues that acknowledgment of "the sincerity and earnestness of one's
opponent" is a legitimate basis for compromise. Benditt, supra note 15, at 35. In my view, it is not
enough to believe that one's opponent is sincere. One must also believe one's opponent's
perspective is grounded in a legitimate moral perspective. Hitler no doubt sincerely believed that
genocide was a justifiable means of "purifying" the German population and culture, but absolute
genetic and cultural homogeneity are not morally defensible values.
247. See Golding, supranote 100, at 17 ("Where full reciprocity exists, the parties recognize each
other as moral equals despite their relative bargaining strengths.").
248. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 53. Participation in deliberative processes
admittedly takes considerable time and effort-more time and effort than many social activists will
be willing to invest. See Iris Marion Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, 29
POL. THEORY 670, 682 (2001) (arguing that a deliberative process "co-opts the energy of citizens
committed to justice, leaving little time for mobilizing people" for other activities intended to
produce reform). The succession of unsuccessful legal challenges to discriminatory laws and
policies over the century preceding the Brown I decision demonstrates, however, that alternative
processes for achieving social change also take considerable time and effort. See, e.g., Tushnet,
supra note 215, at 169-72 (reviewing history of anti-segregation litigation preceding Brown 1).
249. See Benditt, supra note 15, at 26-27 (differentiating bargaining from "compromise" based
upon the parties' attitudes); see also Carens, supra note 67, at 136 ("Even in moral arguments, one
approaches disagreements quite differently if one is seeking areas of mutual agreement and if one is
willing to be persuaded than if one merely wishes to score a few logical points and to refute the
other's case."); Kuflik, supra note 35, at 44 (arguing that "democracy is in danger of degenerating
into a generalized 'prisoner's dilemma' unless compromise is premised upon "the genuine
expression of mutual respect").
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bargaining.25 0 To continue an example begun above, if the members of
Augusta National Golf Club and women who seek membership in it
were to agree, as a consequence of a genuinely deliberative process
intended to avert litigation, that men and women will have exclusive use
of the club on alternating Saturdays and Sundays, and that both men and
women can use the club during the remainder of the week, I suspect
most proponents of deliberative democracy would approve. While this
hypothetical outcome could be partially motivated by the parties'
respective fears about the risks of litigation, it also could reflect their
changed perspectives regarding the possibilities for accommodating the
seemingly conflicting values of inclusiveness and gender equality, on the
one hand, and freedom of association, on the other. Through the process,
each party would offer reasons to support the outcome that the other may
come to recognize as morally legitimate, even if each party is inclined to
privilege one moral principle over others served by the parties' decision.
The outcome is a product of deliberation to the extent that the parties'
motivation for settlement is grounded in mutual respect and an
appreciation of the moral quality of the reasons offered by others. The
outcome is the product of crass bargaining to the extent that parties
consider it a prudent compromise in light of the costs and risks
associated with litigation.
Campos and others are highly skeptical about the power of reason to
resolve moral conflict (at least when the reasons are offered by a judge
or group ofjudges). From Campos' perspective, a judicial decision is not
reasoned unless competing moral principles have been brought into
complete harmony.25' In a pluralistic society such as ours, where values
considered legitimate by large numbers of people often are in
fundamental conflict, this typically will be impossible.
Participants in deliberative processes seldom completely abandon
their own moral perspectives for those of another party, nor should they
be expected to do so. 252 Even the best-designed and best-managed

consensual dispute resolution processes are unlikely to produce a
250. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 71-73 (arguing that the deliberative perspective

accepts bargaining with respect to some issues in dispute (e.g., contested empirical questions)
provided the agreement as a whole is founded on mutually recognizable moral reasons). See also
Carens, supra note 67, at 133 (arguing that bargaining can play a legitimate role in democratic
politics, even when it detracts from deliberation).
251. See CAMPOS, supra note 22, at 160 (arguing that decisions embracing one moral value to the
exclusion of others are "arational").
252. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 93 ("The aim of a [deliberative] process is not
necessarily to induce citizens to change their first-order moral beliefs.").
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complete "harmonic convergence" among parties involved in a heated
moral dispute. When perspective change sufficient to produce some
form of agreement occurs, however, and when the reasons given by each
of the participants to justify their decision have a moral quality that is
recognized by each of the other parties, I believe a form of collective
reasoning has occurred. Reasoning has occurred in the sense that people
who wish to serve multiple values-the substantive values underlying
one's own perspective; democratic participation; self-determination; the
pacific resolution of disputes; even, to some extent perhaps, the values
defended by other stakeholders-collectively embrace those values,
albeit with varying emphasis, as reasons for some concrete policy or
action.25 3 The choice between one party's moral perspective and
another's need not be binary for the outcome of moral deliberation to be
considered reasoned and coherent. Deliberation can bridge moral
perspectives.254
To the extent deliberative forms of social and political engagement
succeed in reorienting understandings and relationships among citizens
divided by deep value differences, they may often contribute as much or
more to the evolution of social norms than would a U.S. Supreme Court
decision. While much of the discussion among political theorists
regarding deliberative democracy focuses on promoting and enhancing
moral deliberation among elected officials, some proponents of
deliberative democracy also hope to increase the quantity and quality of
deliberation between representatives and citizens, as well as directly
among citizens. 255 Deliberative democracy is practiced both when public
253. Deliberative democracy is not about achieving harmony at the expense of the substantive
values the parties seek to advance through deliberative processes. See, e.g., GUTMANN &
THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 93 ("Deliberative reasoning is not correctly represented if it is
described as giving more weight to the value of mutual respect or deliberation than (for example) to
the sanctity of life.").
254. See Kuflik, supra note 35, at 50 (arguing that "a morally appropriate balance between valid
concerns is not to be equated with a compromise of moral integrity").
255. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 42 (advocating the creation of more
"deliberative forums" that bring "previously excluded voices into politics"). New York University
law professor Larry Kramer considers deliberative democracy to be anti-populist because, in his
view, its procedural requirements "can be met only by small bodies far removed from direct popular
control." Larry Kramer, We the People: Who Has the Last Word on the Constitution?, BOSTON
REV., Feb.-Mar. 2004, at 14, 19 (2004). While it becomes more difficult to meet the procedural
requirements of deliberative democracy as the size of a group increases, the requirements can
nonetheless be met in groups with several hundred members. Proponents of deliberative democracy
envision deliberative processes being employed in the U.S. House of Representatives, for example,
or by state legislatures. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 46-47 (encouraging
deliberation among legislators). Furthermore, the proceedings of smaller groups, including groups
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officials deliberate and when deliberations among citizens are
purposefully structured and managed to provide inputs into broader
political processes. In order to maximize the potential for settlements of
significant cases to contribute to the evolution of social norms and
public policy, we must look for ways to connect deliberation among
citizen-disputants to broader political processes and to encourage open
(i.e., non-secret) settlements.
Broadly participatory negotiation processes have long been a major
feature of the administrative rulemaking process. 256 Consensus-building
processes also are frequently used in efforts to resolve, or to contribute
to the constructive management and eventual resolution of, the types of
disputes that can give rise to significant cases but which are not
necessarily the subject of pending litigation to which participants in the
process are party. These processes, which often are facilitated by nonlawyer conflict resolution practitioners, have been used to foster
understanding and facilitate cooperative action among opposing parties
in a wide variety of disputes, including opposing factions in the abortion
debate; 257 policy makers and activists concerned with development and
population policy; 258 government officials, activists and taxpayers with
opposing perspectives on the use of public funds for HIV/AIDS
treatment programs; 259 and environmentalists, landowners, government
officials and others divided over how to respond to pollution and other
public health problems.26 °
Although, as Abram Chayes first observed, courts have become
increasingly involved in helping parties fashion negotiated settlements,
such broadly inclusive, consensus-based processes typically have not
of ordinary citizens, sometimes can be linked effectively to more inclusive political processes.
256. See generally Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) (critiquing existing approaches to negotiated rulemaking and offering
suggestions for reform); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations:A Curefor the Malaise, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1 (1982) (advocating even greater negotiation among stakeholders and agencies in the
development of administrative rules).
257. See, e.g., Chasin, supra note 219, at 327 (describing deliberative process involving opposing
factions in the abortion debate); LeBaron & Carstarphen, supra note 139, at 1037-43 (describing
deliberative process involving opposing factions in the abortion debate).
258. See Chasin, supra note 219, at 328 (describing dialogue among nongovernmental
organizations concerned with population, women's health, and environmental issues in advance of
United Nations Conference on Population and Development).
259. See Hughes, supra note 138, at 1014-28 (describing deliberative process regarding use of
public funds for HIV/AIDS treatment programs).
260. See, e.g., SUSSKIND & FIELD, supra note 103, at 42-59 (describing consensus building
approach to resolving an environmental dispute).
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been formally integrated into the adjudicative process. 26 1 Over the
course of the past decade or so, however, courts have increasingly begun
to experiment with notions of problem-solving 262 and restorative
justice 26 in ways that involve the disputants and other affected
stakeholders in shaping the outcome of a judicial proceeding.
Margaret Farrell offers one vision of how litigation and negotiation
could have interacted to produce a substantive outcome in Roe v. Wade
that, in her view, may have more fully reflected the complexity of the
issues involved and better accommodated the full range of affected
parties-not just women and the unborn, but health care providers,
fathers, local, state and federal agencies, and others.264 Farrell contends
that
by trying to resolve the social issues raised by abortion
technology through litigation, we have transformed real-life,
contextual, relational, complex facts about abortion into a twosided contest between generalized maternal rights to privacy and
theoretical state interests in potential human life, a process that
teaches us little about the moral and social problems that we seek
to resolve.265
Farrell envisions the use of court-connected processes geared toward
achieving collaborative solutions to the fundamental problems
underlying a dispute.2 66 The specific process Farrell would have had the
trial court in Roe v. Wade employ is an adaptation of the negotiated
rulemaking process employed in the development of administrative
regulations.2 67 This process typically involves an assessment period
during which affected parties are identified, followed by notice to
affected parties, a fact-finding stage, and a facilitated, consensus-based
process that culminates in the development of a draft regulation that is

261. See Chayes, supra note 11, at 1298-1302.
262. See, e.g., Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A BriefPrimer, 23 LAW
& POL'Y 125, 126-27 (2001) (providing examples of courts that attempt to reform dysfunctional
social systems, rather than merely adjudicating liability based upon past conduct).
263. See, e.g., Mark Umbreit, Mediation of Victim Offender Conflict, 1988 Mo. J. DisP. RESOL.
86, 86-96 (describing victim-offender mediation process implementing restorative justice ideal in
criminal proceedings).
264. See generally Farrell, supra note 11, at 330-53 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)).
265. See id. at 274.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 330-31.
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published for public commentary.
Farrell imagines a court-connected process that incorporates many of
these elements. After Roe was initiated, she would have had the Court
orchestrate a process in which other affected parties were identified and
joined, discovery and other fact-finding efforts were undertaken, and
settlement talks occurred (though not necessarily facilitated by the
judge). If a consensus solution had emerged, it then would have been
expressed in a multi-stakeholder settlement agreement or in a proposed
bill or administrative rule. If a consensus solution did not emerge, the
judge would have rendered a decision that was informed and constrained
by the totality of facts presented, the competing perspectives of a broad
range of affected parties, and, of course, existing substantive law.
I am not necessarily advocating widespread deployment of Farrell's
proposed approach in all its particulars. Needless to say, many practical
and legal issues would have to be resolved before the exact process
imagined by Farrell could be utilized. 269 Farrell's process nonetheless
illustrates that it is possible to imagine a court-connected settlement
process with the potential to inform official political processes and
influence legislation and administrative policy. Procedures like Farrell's,
and others we could imagine, can create "feedback loops" among the
various social and political actors that contribute to social change. 270 Of
course, there are constitutional and practical limits to what the parties
can accomplish by agreement in some cases. In the Roe case, existing
Texas law banned abortions. 27 1 The parties could not have agreed simply
to permit the plaintiff to terminate her pregnancy. Settlements resulting
from deliberative processes must be designed to influence official
lawmaking processes whenever current law prevents conduct the parties
wish to permit.
Even when a settlement process is not formally or informally linked
to legislative or administrative policy-making processes, however,
settlement of a significant case can contribute to the fund of social norms
that influence behavior (including others' litigation and settlement
decisions), the development of public policy, and subsequent judicial
268. See id. at 325-30.
269. Farrell anticipates and addresses many of these issues. See id. at 325-43 (discussing
procedures for inclusion of nonparties and fact-finding).
270. Where a settlement does become linked to an official lawmaking process-for example, by
producing and advancing a draft rule or bill-one would hope that the process by which regulators
or legislators consider it is as deliberative as the process by which the parties produced it.
271. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1973).
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decisions. As Robert Ellickson has observed, "[i]n a well-functioning
civilization.., informal rules [that contribute to the maintenance of
social order] ... are among the most magnificent of cultural
achievements. 2 72 Settlements resolving significant cases will not always
have the force of law (except among the parties), but they may have
important social influence nonetheless.
To maximize a settlement's contribution to the fund of "informal
rules" praised by Ellickson, its terms arguably should be made public.2 73
This is undoubtedly true, yet the mere fact of settlement may alter the
social atmosphere surrounding the dispute. A settlement presumably
signals to (approving and disapproving) others that some minimal
economy of shared values developed among the parties. A settlement
suggests that the parties concluded that they inhabit a universe of shared
meaning after all, even if they occupy distant corners of it. The simple
confirmation that settlement possibilities exist is arguably a significant
contribution to the ongoing development of social norms concerning the
central issues in any dispute involving deeply held values. As Robinson
and his colleagues explain, dialogue processes "free partisans of some
illusions that they hold not only about their ideological adversaries but
about their own side as well (i.e., illusions of homogeneity, moral
consensus, and extremism), which would in turn make it easier for them
to express their own dissenting views. 2 74 If partisans who are not
involved in a settlement see that agreement is possible, they may be
more inclined toward conciliatory interaction with those ideological
adversaries who they themselves encounter.
I doubt that many settlements of significant cases would remain
entirely secret in jurisdictions where confidential settlements are
permitted, since public disclosure of at least some of the principal
settlement terms is likely to be a key interest of one or more of the
parties and a necessary byproduct of implementation of the settlement.
While damage payments and other monetary expenditures may be one
feature of the parties' agreement in some cases, most settlements of

272. ELLICKSON, supra note 18, at 184.

273. See Luban, Erosion, supra note 9, at 2648-58 (arguing against confidential settlements). For
my purposes, mass tort cases, where defendants frequently wish to keep secret the amount of
damages paid in settlement of the plaintiffs' claims, are not "significant cases." Much of Luban's
concern about secrecy arises in response to settlement of these cases. Id.
274. Robinson, supra note 108, at 416. See also Thompson & Gonzalez, supra note 72, at 98
(arguing that disputants will be more persistent and creative in their efforts to reach agreement if
there are precedents for resolving ideological conflict through negotiation).
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significant cases about school prayer, abortion, pollution entitlements or
environmental resource allocation, affirmative action, and the like are
unlikely to be premised primarily on financial terms. Nonetheless, I
generally favor policies limiting or prohibiting confidential settlements
where they are not necessary to protect trade secrets, preserve
established privileges, or serve other narrowly focused and beneficial
social purposes.2 75
In this Part, I have argued that settlements, like adjudication, can have
democratic value and make positive contributions to the evolution of
social norms. David Luban, a thoughtful critic (though not an ardent
opponent) 27 6 of settlement, acknowledges this possibility, but he believes
that adjudication's contributions to democracy are bound to be
qualitatively superior to settlement's contributions. Luban associates
adjudication with what he calls the "public-life conception" of politics,
which is characterized by forms of deliberation in which individuals
work at "building consensus around ideals rather than getting the right
answer, and in discovering worthy ends in addition to efficient
means. ''27 Although Luban's later writing on settlement acknowledges
the potential of consensual dispute resolution processes to contribute to
social change by occasionally producing what he calls "revisionary
justice," he nonetheless associates settlement primarily with a "problemsolving conception" of politics, which is about finding the cleverest
means to one's desired end.27 8
Luban acknowledges that a "lucky and skillfully-conducted mediation
might actually end in both parties giving according to their abilities and
receiving according to their needs," but he believes that such moments
275. For an overview of arguments for and against placing limits on confidential settlements, see
the following white paper published by New England Legal Foundation: CHRISTINE HUGHES,

CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS (2003) (on file with author). Confidentiality of court documents and
settlement terms must be distinguished from confidentiality of settlement negotiations, which
should remain private to the extent necessary to protect the parties or sustain the process. Parties to
deliberative processes sometimes participate at significant personal risk to their reputations (and
even their physical safety), and they should determine whether and when to publicize their
participation. See infra Part VI.B. Of course, sunshine laws may sometimes prevent parties from

conducting their discussions privately.
276. Luban's earlier writings on settlement are somewhat more negative and skeptical than his
later writings. Compare Luban, Quality, supra note 35, at 407-11 (arguing that alternative dispute
resolution processes are unlikely to contribute to social change), with Luban, Erosion, supra note 9,

at 2634 (acknowledging limited potential of consensual dispute resolution processes to contribute to
social change).
277. Luban, Erosion,supra note 9, at 2634.
278. id.
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will be rare and that we therefore should not expect consensual dispute
resolution processes to contribute significantly to major social change.279
Luban believes that consensual dispute resolution processes will seldom
produce revisionary justice because more powerful parties will refuse to
use them, or will exit from them, if they perceive that neutrals are
attempting to empower weaker parties to make more than incremental
gains through the process. 280 According to Luban, this limits the extent
to which dispute resolution processes can produce outcomes that depart
significantly from existing legal entitlements.28'
It may be true that sweeping social change will seldom be achieved
through deliberative dispute resolution processes, yet excessive
attachment to adjudication may cause our collective consensus-building
capabilities to atrophy, which arguably makes attempts at collective
deliberation even more difficult to undertake and even less likely to
succeed. I believe it is wrong to associate adjudication primarily with the
service of the public interest and the potential for significant social
progress and to associate settlement primarily with the service of private
interests and incremental change within the current system of legal
entitlements. While it is true that all parties, including those with greater
economic and social power, enter mediation, adjudication, or any other
dispute resolution process with their own self-interested objectives,
those who participate openly in deliberative processes may find that their
own and others' perceptions of self-interest shift, producing greater
alignment between competing conceptions of justice at play in the
dialogue and a greater willingness to serve "public" objectives through
whatever outcome is produced. 282 At their best, consensus-based
processes aimed at settlement of the types of disputes that give rise to
significant cases are a form of political activity consistent with the
public-life conception of politics that Luban favors.
Fiss, unlike Luban, is unwilling to grant that settlement can play any
role in promoting social justice. He argues that settlement allows society

279. Luban, supra note 35, at 408-09.
280. Luban acknowledges that even incremental gains may be preferable to no gains at all, when
that is what one can expect from litigation. "[W]hatever virtue ADR programs possess will lie in the
fact that they are marginally better than existing alternatives ... and not in the expectation that they
achieve utopian justice." Id. at 387.
281. Id. at 409.
282. Luban certainly acknowledges that such shifts can occur. Luban, supra note 35, at 398. He
simply doubts that many powerful parties will be willing to put themselves in harm's way. Id. at
413.
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to "mask[] its basic contradictions. 2 83 This is true only with respect to
settlements that are strategically motivated. Processes that promote
moral deliberation and perspective change actually bring social
contradictions to the surface, where they can be constructively examined
and addressed by the parties themselves. Compared to these processes,
litigation allows us to mask our contradictions-chief among which is
the desire to impose our own values on others, even though we know we
live in a world that must be capable of peacefully reconciling our own
values with others' values. Litigation, as I have argued, temporarily
shifts the broader social negotiation that must occur to a different
location in the social sphere where, by institutional design, a
"resolution" appears more readily achievable. As Rosenberg's research
arguably demonstrates, however, a U.S. Supreme Court decision seldom,
if ever, single-handedly produces a durable resolution of deep social
conflict. In the end, each deep division must be bridged, if at all, through
a meta-dialog in which the Court is an influential, but not an omnipotent,
participant.284
It is, of course, impossible to say, from "the public's perspective,"
whether settlement of a particular ideologically based dispute is
preferable to a judicial decision, because citizens' views on any
contested moral issue are, by definition, diverse. At best we can identify
a range of coherent moral perspectives on a given issue that are held by
significant numbers of people. If those citizens most immediately
affected by a dispute experience some degree of genuine perspective
change as a result of their participation in a process of moral dialogue,
and if their changed perspectives produce somewhat more constructive
and mutually beneficial relations, I would likely respect the outcome of
their process, even if it did not give full expression to my own "chosen
ideals." If I did not, and if I had standing and cause to sue, I obviously
would be free to seek a judicial decision consistent with my ideals.
Indeed, one of the potential costs of settlement of any significant case is

283. Fiss, supra note 2, at 1086.
284. As Habermas states,
[D]eliberative politics remains part of a complex society, which, as a whole, resists the
normative approach practiced in legal theory ....[T]he discourse-theoretic reading of
democracy has a point of contact with a detached social-scientific approach that considers the
political system neither apex nor center nor even the structural core of society, but just one
action system among others. On the other hand, because it provides a safety mechanism for
solving problems that threaten social integration, politics must be able to communicate through
the medium of law with all the other legitimately ordered spheres of action ....
HABERMAS, supra note 82, at 302 (emphasis in original).
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that the benefits realized as a result of the time, effort and other
resources expended in achieving it will be nullified by a subsequent
decision on the merits in a case brought by parties who are similarly
situated.
VI. THE MORAL LEGITIMACY OF SETTLING SIGNIFICANT
CASES
Having discussed the practical ways in which parties and the public
may benefit through settlement of a significant case, or the type of
dispute that may give rise to one, I wish to address the normative
dimension of settlement more explicitly. Some argue that "peace" by
whatever name-for example, "participatory politics," "social capacity
to deal with tough problems," or "consensus"-should not come at the
expense of "justice" or moral rightness. 285 From this perspective, a
compromise reached by parties to a value-laden dispute is indicative of
weakness of character and moral relativism-which, in its strongest
form, is the belief that everyone's values are as valid as everyone else's
values, so it is wrong to judge others or to try to make them comply with
one's own values. 286 Greater public participation and greater social
capacity to manage strong disagreement may be important benefits of
deliberative forms of democratic practice, but are the decisions they
produce morally unsound? Is peace achieved at the expense of justice?
As indicated above, I do not consider courts to be uniquely capable of
making moral judgments. Courts, however, sometimes do make
absolutist judgments, in the sense that they validate one party's moral
perspective to the exclusion of other perspectives. In contrast, settlement
typically involves acceptance of an outcome that balances the
perspectives and objectives of all parties, though such outcomes can, and
often do, favor one party's perspectives and objectives over those of
others. This distinction-between the inevitability of accommodation in
settlement and the possibility of an uncompromising judicial decisionnaturally raises questions about the moral integrity of settlement relative
to a judgment reached through adjudication.
In this Part, I anticipate and counter claims that an agreement
resolving a significant case necessarily lacks moral integrity. I also
present a set of principles for designing consensual dispute resolution
285. See Fiss, supra note 2, at 1075; see also Coleman & Silver, supra note 13, at 108 (arguing
that "we sacrifice justice for the sake of efficiency and peace" when we settle).
286. See David Wong, Relativism, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 442, 442 (Peter Singer ed., 1993).
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processes geared toward resolving disputes involving deep value
differences. Fidelity to these principles, I argue, increases the likelihood
that the outcomes of such processes will be morally sound (as well as
socially desirable and durable). We should not be satisfied with the
increased public participation and greater social capacity to manage
strong disagreement that may result from deliberative forms of
democratic practice unless we also believe that such practices are
capable of producing agreements that are morally sound.
A.

Moral Relativism?

I should note preliminarily that I do not consider strategic settlement
to be indicative of moral relativism for the simple reason that neither
party has acknowledged the legitimacy of the other's perspective. In the
Piscatawaycase, for example, Ms. Taxman presumably believed that her
moral perspective had been sufficiently vindicated through her trial and
appellate court victories, and that further litigation therefore was not
justified in light of other things she valued-for example, privacy and
financial security, both of which might be jeopardized through continued
litigation.2 87 The Piscataway school district determined that the best way
to advance its values was not to attempt to advance them before the U.S.
Supreme Court at that time. Neither party's decision to settle was
motivated by deference to the other party or the other party's
perspective.
The issue of moral relativism is more pressing in the context of
settlements resulting from collective moral deliberation. Those who
consider such settlements to be indicative of moral relativism are, in a
sense, correct, but one must distinguish between moral relativism in its
strong and weak forms. One who embraces moral relativism in its
strongest form (as defined above) would have difficulty ever justifying
litigation or any other form of coercive engagement with someone who
holds different views. For an extreme relativist, negotiation would be the
only acceptable means for resolving moral conflict-if indeed one
sought to advance one's substantive values in the face of others'
resistance at all.
In the weak form of moral relativism, one has genuine confidence in
287. Had Ms. Taxman settled before trial, rather than after achieving significant success in court,
her decision still would not necessarily indicate moral relativism. While one party or the other is
likely to be the clear victor in litigation, each party may reasonably conclude that the costs of
proceeding to trial are too great in light of one's tolerance for risk.

956
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one's moral convictions,288 but one's convictions include what
philosopher David Wong calls the justification principle. 28 9 The
justification principle holds that it generally "is wrong to impose one's
views on another person unless one can justify them to him or her ....
[It is] an ethic that values interaction between members of different
cultures through mutual consent., 290 One finds firm support for the
justification principle in both deontological and social contractualist
moral theory.291 From a Kantian perspective, the justification principle
follows from the notion that people are to be regarded as ends in
themselves, not as means to satisfaction of one's own objectives or
preferences. From the perspective of social contract theory, the
justification principle affirms the moral value of consent in human
relations.
The justification principle is an inherent feature of the theory of
deliberative democracy. 292 It gives rise to a prima facie duty to obtain
consent before interfering with others' actions, but this duty exists
alongside those that flow from one's other moral convictions. Whenever
the justification principle conflicts with one's other convictions, one
must make a judgment about whether it should be overridden-that is,
whether unilateral, coercive action in service of another conviction one
holds is justified under the circumstances.293 In the context of disputes
involving deeply held values, these circumstances may include those
where the other party refuses to negotiate and the moral dangers of delay
are great, or where the other party is not negotiating in good faith.
Settlement is not itself a primary goal; when it is achieved, it is merely
the byproduct of the parties' efforts to serve their respective moral
288. As Wong explains, confidence in one's convictions need not depend upon an absolute belief
that "one's morality is the only true or the most justified one." Wong, supra note 286, at 449.
289. DAVID WONG, MORAL RELATIVITY 180 (1984).
290. Id.
29 1. Id. at 18 1; see also Wong, supra note 286, at 448 (associating weak form of moral relativism
with social contract tradition).
292. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Deliberationand Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY 17,
22 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989) (noting that reason-giving and a commitment to
resolving disagreements "through free deliberation among equals" are features of deliberative
democracy); GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 55 (arguing that deliberative democracy

can be embraced only by citizens motivated to find mutually acceptable terms for social
cooperation). The search for mutually acceptable terms of association is a feature of the social
contract tradition more generally, as expressed in the work of theorists such as Locke, Rousseau,
Kant, and Rawls. See, e.g., Kuflik, supra note 35, at 56-57 (associating notion of"justice as mutual
accommodation" with social contract tradition).
293. See WONG, supranote 289, at 186.
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convictions in a manner that satisfies the justification principle. The

justification principle gives rise to a presumption in favor of negotiation,
however, at least for the purpose of sincerely exploring whether and
where common ground may exist. 294 The justification principle does not

dilute or undermine one's other moral convictions; rather, it engenders a
certain humility with respect to them,2 95 and a certain confidence (as
opposed to smugness) that allows one to engage in open and honest
dialogue about them with other sincere people willing to engage one in
good faith.
The strong form of moral relativism, which is associated with a lack

of convictions tending toward nihilism, is too often conflated with moral
relativism in its weak form. 29 6 For example, Fiss implicitly brands

proponents of settlement as advocates of the strong form of moral
relativism by accusing them of pursuing peace at the expense of
justice 297 and by insisting that settlement in the service of one's ideals is
not possible.298 However, the substantive moral principles implicated in
a dispute, and the justification principle alike, are legitimate values, all

worthy of defense. One can be a relativist in the weak sense without
being amoral, and one can pursue peace without sacrificing justice. 299
294. 1 would not translate this presumption into a requirement that parties attempt to resolve an
ideologically based dispute as a condition of filing suit or proceeding to trial-a requirement of
which Fiss also would disapprove. See Fiss, supra note 76, at 1670-71.
295. See CARL COHEN, DEMOCRACY 182 (1971) ("[O]ne's knowledge of the truth and justice of
his principles, or his firm belief in them, is counterbalanced within the [democratic] community by
others who also know, or firmly believe, that other principles, in direct conflict with his own, are
just and true."); Benditt, supra note 15, at 35 (arguing that an "attitude of humility" creates potential
for a compromise resolution of a conflict of principles).
296. See Wong, supra note 286, at 449 (noting that the strong form of moral relativism has given
the weak form a bad name).
297. See Fiss, supra note 2, at 1075. Coleman and Silver argue that, from the public's
perspective, it would be desirable to litigate all disputes if litigation costs were zero, because
litigated outcomes are just outcomes. See Coleman & Silver, supra note 13, at 108. Their claim has
some appeal with respect to most ordinary cases, where social norms and legal norms are aligned
and broadly accepted, but it is questionable when applied to significant cases, where social norms
are hotly contested, for at least two reasons. First, losers of significant cases and their sympathizers
are even less likely to view the unfavorable decision as just than losers of ordinary cases. Second,
from the public's perspective, the only potential advantage of litigating all significant cases is the
possibility that a recently established or reaffirmed legal norm will dampen further conflict. As we
have seen, however, the court's ability to resolve social conflict on morally charged issues
unilaterally is limited.
298. See Fiss,supra note 2, at 1086.
299. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 126 (1971) ("The circumstances of justice may be
described as the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and
necessary."); Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Peace, supra note 10, at 1767 (arguing that we should
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Fiss and others are too quick to associate firmness of principle with
30 0
morality, and compromise with expedience and moral weakness.
Settlements reached through truly deliberative processes are not sellouts. We do not succumb to moral relativism in its strong form merely
by challenging ourselves to understand, and, when we glimpse
something of their logic and legitimacy, accommodate, others' values
through agreements that also acknowledge our own. Settlements
resulting from moral deliberation are evidence that the parties recognize
the moral and social costs of effectively outlawing one perspective or the
other, and have concluded that justice may find a fuller expression under
the circumstances in some arrangement that attempts to confront the full
complexity of the situation. We can compromise asserted claims and
favored policies without sacrificing the moral principles on which they
are based.30 1
As I indicated earlier,30 2 all proponents of deliberative democracy
consider reason-giving (and reason-probing) to be a central feature of
deliberative processes, but they differ regarding the extent to which the
structure and integrity of the process itself validates, from a moral
perspective, the reasons on which an outcome is premised. At one end of
the spectrum is Habermas's discourse theory, which seems to hold that
any outcome produced by a process that satisfies certain procedural
norms is, by definition, morally justified, provided the participants
"seek to achieve 'peaceful' coexistence, mutual understanding and justice simultaneously").
300. Luban sometimes seems to fall prey to such dichotomizing, as in a hypothetical he offers in
one of his articles:
Suppose half the people in a nation believe-with arguments-"To each according to his
need," while -the other half believes "To each according to his work." (The latter too have
arguments.) Each finds the other's principle unacceptable; eventually they compromise on
"To each according to his work, unless his work does not suffice to meet his most basic
needs: then we keep him afloat with transfer payments." The compromise principle is
wrong, even morally wrong, if either side is right, for it violates distributive justice. It is,
moreover, a principle believed by no one in the society.
David Luban, Bargainingand Compromise: Recent Work on Negotiation and Informal Justice, 14
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 397, 415 (1985) (emphasis in original). Luban assumes his negotiators reached
their decision solely for purposes of expedience, by logrolling issues at play in the negotiation. He
could have just as easily imagined the negotiators genuinely influencing each other, resulting in
genuinely changed perspectives. There is nothing morally incoherent about the third principle
Luban's negotiators produce, as Luban suggests. Luban's hypothetical loses its force if we imagine
that the negotiators' third principle is not the product of superficial horse-trading around entrenched
interests, but the product of a truly deliberative process through which some degree of perspective
change has occurred.
301. See Benditt, supra note 15, at 27.
302. See supra Part V.
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regard each other as "free and equal" and the outcome is consistent with
that premise.3 °3 At the other end of the spectrum are Gutmann and
Thompson, who believe that procedural norms can help promote, but
cannot alone ensure, the moral integrity of the outcome of a deliberative
process. In their view, the outcome of a deliberative process lacks moral
justification if it fails to
protect certain basic liberties and opportunities
3 °4
of those affected by it.
Like Gutmann and Thompson, I believe the outcome of a deliberative
process cannot be morally justified solely by efforts to adhere to
procedural norms. Proponents of alternatives to litigation have been
criticized-fairly, I believe-as sometimes being too focused on
procedures and not sufficiently focused on the substantive integrity of
the outcomes produced by the procedures they advocate. 30 5 The sort of
ideal discursive conditions imagined by Habermas and others will
seldom, if ever, be fully realized in practice. In the context of a process
designed to explore the potential for settlement of a significant case, the
participants and facilitator(s) will at best achieve a close approximation
of the type of ideal process he imagines. If we accept that procedural
norms cannot ensure the moral integrity of outcomes, however, a
difficult question arises: Who determines whether the basic rights of
those affected by a settlement are adequately protected?
In the United States, the decision about whether to settle, and on what
terms, typically is wholly within the discretion of the parties
themselves. 30 6 Like Menkel-Meadow, I believe this is the proper place
303. Although no substantive norms constrain the process Habermas imagines, he apparently
believes that any decision that satisfies the procedural norms he specifies, including the character of
the participants' regard for one another, would safeguard the basic rights of all who are affected by
the decision. See generally Jiirgen Habermas, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of
Philosophical Justification, in

MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

AND

COMMUNICATIVE

ACTION

43

(Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990) (explaining discourse ethics theory).
304. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 199-229. Basic liberties protect "the physical
and mental integrity of persons," ensuring freedom from such physical violations as "compulsory
organ donations" and such mental violations as constraints on "religious or moral convictions." Id.
at 204. Basic opportunities include access to such goods as an adequate income (i.e., the ability to
compete for a job), physical security, and basic levels of education, health care, food, and housing.
Id. at 217; see also Kuflik, supra note 35, at 43-48 (arguing that compromise is illegitimate if it
disregards minimum constitutional guarantees).
305. See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 169, at 6-8 (criticizing negotiation proponent Roger Fisher
and colleagues for emphasizing procedural considerations at the expense of moral substance in their
prescriptions regarding cease-fire negotiations in Yugoslavian civil war).
306. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, court approval of settlements is required only in
class actions and receivership proceedings. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e), 66. A small number of federal and
state statutes require judicial approval of settlements in special types of cases. See, e.g., Tunney Act,
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for decision-making power to reside. Fiss and other critics of settlement
of significant cases would not, of course, deprive parties of the right to
settle their dispute on terms of their own choosing. They simply do not
recognize settlements as morally legitimate to the extent they reflect an
apparent compromise of the parties' moral convictions.3 °7 This
perspective is ironic, given that many judicial decisions often are careful
"balancing acts" that try to accommodate features of competing moral
views. 308
Of course, it is possible that parties to a process designed to
encourage moral deliberation could agree to a settlement that they do not
regard as even minimally protective of some basic liberty or opportunity,
but which they regard as superior to the outcome they would achieve
through litigation or legislation. Settlement is considered the least bad
alternative, rather than a good alternative. In this event, while it is
possible that parties could view settlement as pragmatic and rational in
some very narrow sense, it is not morally justified according to the
principles of deliberative democracy articulated by Gutmann and
Thompson. Disengaging from the negotiation and pursuing one's
objectives through other means-including, perhaps, litigation, even if
one fully expects to lose-is the morally preferable course of action,
even if its effects are largely expressive.30 9 Settlement on terms that the
weaker party does not consider adequately protective of basic liberties
and opportunities achieves neither justice nor peace (in any sense that is
likely to prove durable), so we obviously should not encourage it.
These arguments in favor of the justification principle and, implicitly,
for moral relativism in its weak sense obviously will be entirely
unsatisfying to anyone whose perspective on a charged moral issue is
completely deontological-for example, a pro-life advocate who does
not believe that a basic liberty of a woman who wishes to have an
15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1997) (mandating judicial review of antitrust settlements). Settlement in all
other cases occurs without judicial review.
307. See Fiss, supra note 2, at 1086 ("To settle for something means to accept less than some
ideal.").
308. See supra Part 11.13.
309. See Gutmann, supra note 169, at 8 ("An immoral negotiated resolution to a moral conflict in
politics may be worse than going to war or no resolution at all."); see also Benditt, supra note 15, at
29-30 (arguing that genuine compromise cannot occur where "the alternative is to be forced into a
still worse situation"). But see Carens, supra note 67, at 130 ("[lI]t might be necessary for the party
with the more legitimate interests to compromise at times simply because the other has more power,
but it would be a political and moral error to accept the other party's interests as legitimate simply
because of this power.").
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abortion will be denied if she cannot obtain one, and that this interest
should be afforded some degree of deference. Anyone who holds such
views would react disapprovingly to a settlement in which, for example,
a pro-life and a pro-choice organization agreed to an extended period of
cessation from litigation on the condition that each organization engage
in specific activities that they hope will measurably reduce both the
number of unwanted pregnancies and the number of abortions. During
this standstill period, abortions obviously would continue to occur, even
if the parties' efforts were dramatically successful at reducing their
number. The only way a pro-life advocate could regard such an
agreement as having moral integrity is through a willingness to accept a
balancing of moral perspectives and objectives that he or she hopes will
contribute to a reduction in unwanted pregnancies and increased
utilization of alternatives to abortion (i.e., parenthood with adequate
social and economic support or adoption), while also preserving abortion
as an option that is used less frequently as a result of the parties'
efforts. 310 The pro-life advocate who refuses to recognize the choice to
terminate a pregnancy as a fundamental liberty must bear in mind,
however, that the outcome of litigation may be a balancing of
perspectives and objectives that he or she finds similarly unacceptable.
In sum, I find it difficult to understand why a decision reached by the
disputants through an adequate deliberative process lacks moral integrity
if a decision by empanelled judges does not-even if we assume,
perhaps somewhat generously, that the interaction among appellate
judges typically has the character of genuine moral deliberation. 311 For
the reasons indicated at the beginning of this subpart, it also is difficult
to understand why a strategic settlement like the one that concluded the
Piscataway litigation lacks moral integrity. Why should we not regard
310. Such a balancing achieved through genuine moral deliberation differs from an outcome
based upon utilitarian principles, even when the outcome resembles one that a utilitarian
policymaking process might produce. As indicated above, deliberative processes seek to do more
than uncover preferences and other private information in a search for an outcome that will
maximally satisfy the participants' competing interests. They seek to align preferences through
discourse about the type of society in which the participants wish to live, and they do not
necessarily treat all conceptions of the good as fungible, which much of utilitarian theory tends to
do. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 165-98 (comparing and contrasting deliberative
and utilitarian approaches to policymaking).
311. For one recent example of interaction among appellate judges that falls far short of the
deliberative ideal, see Adam Liptak, Order Lacking on a Court: U.S. Appellate Judges in Cincinnati
Spar in Public, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at A 10 (reporting repeated accusations of "lying and
underhanded conduct in important cases involving the death penalty and affirmative action" among
the judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit).
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an outcome that emerges from the types of negotiations I have described
as having moral substance, particularly when adjudication, if it is
presumed to have moral integrity, is an effective alternative to
negotiation? As I have indicated, I accept the prerogative of parties to
press their claims to a final judgment, with or without first attempting to
negotiate, when they reasonably believe, after efforts to achieve
consensus (or giving due consideration to such efforts), that there is only
one way that justice can be served. I also believe, however, that the very
fact that parties have this prerogative should dispel any general
hesitation one might have about exploring the potential for a consensual
resolution of the dispute through an adequate deliberative process.
B.

DeliberativeDemocratic Theory and Dispute ProcessDesign

If the structure of a deliberative process cannot ensure the moral
integrity of the outcome it produces, sound design and administration of
the process according to the principles of deliberative democratic theory
can at least help promote the just, consensual resolution of disputes
involving deep moral disagreement. Deliberative democratic theory
provides meta-principles that dispute resolution practitioners can use to
structure and manage dialogues intended to contribute to the resolution
of disputes involving divisive moral issues.31 2 These principles are
distinct from the many micro choices and moves that neutrals must
make, but they can serve as touchstones that guide their process choices.
The foundational principles of deliberative democracy are concerned
with its goals, its procedural features, and the ideal disposition of the
participants in deliberative processes. These principles can be grouped
and labeled, and their requirements elucidated, as indicated in the
following chart. To the extent these principles do not encompass other,
more familiar principles that are widely considered to be cornerstones of
mediation and consensus-building processes-such as facilitator
neutrality, informed consent, and party self-determination--they are
intended to complement, rather than displace, them.

312. Habermas might object to the extension of deliberative principles into the realm of
settlement processes, though Cohen, Gutmann, and Thompson would not. See GUTMANN &
THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 131; HABERMAS, supra note 82, at 304-05; Cohen, supra note 292, at
21.
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DELIBERATIVE

Principle

DISPUTE

RESOLUTION

]Requirements

GOALS
1. Reasoned Agreement

Consensus based on reasons that all
parties
recognize
as
being
grounded in legitimate moral
visions which are sincerely held
and advocated in good faith.3" 3

2. Protection of Basic Rights

All parties believe the agreement
adequately protects basic liberties
and opportunities.3 14

3. Public Influence

To the extent practicable, the
process and/or its output are
formally or informally linked to
official political processes or
otherwise designed to influence the
development of social norms
regarding the subject matter of the
dispute.

PROCEDURE
4. Inclusiveness

The process is broadly inclusive of
those potentially affected by its
outcome or representatives who are
accountable to them, all of whom

313. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 57; HABERMAS, supra note 82, at 306;
Cohen, supra note 292, at 23.
314. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 199-29. Gutmann and Thompson do not
address the difficult problem of who decides whether rights are minimally satisfied. In the context
of setq1ement of significant cases, or the type of disputes that could give rise to them, I place that
determination with the parties themselves.
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have an equal opportunity to be

Iheard."'

5

5. Publicity

The process and its outcome are
made as public as they can be
without compromising the physical
or psychological security of the
participants or the316sustainability of
the process itself.

6. Open Agenda

Participants are free to make any
assertion and to introduce any issue
that could be addressed effectively
through an agreement or could
influence its terms.317

7. Open Exchange

Participants exchange and critically
evaluate perspectives, information,
proposals, and reasons.3 18

PARTICIPANT DISPOSITION
8. Reciprocity

Participants regard one another as
free and equal persons and treat
each other respectfully, 31 9 keeping
strategic motivations and coercive
behavior in check, speaking to
make oneself understood, and

315. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 128-64; HABERMAS, supra note 82, at 305;

Habermas, supra note 303, at 89.
316. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 95-127; HABERMAS, supra note 82, at 305;
see also Luban, supra note 35, at 416 ("The publicity principle-intended as a moral requirement
on public policy-requires of any defensible policy that it be capable of withstanding general,
public knowledge that it is in place.").
317. See HABERMAS, supranote 82, at 306; Habermas, supra note 303, at 89.
318. See HABERMAS, supra note 82, at 305; Cohen, supra note 292, at 22.
319. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 52-94; HABERMAS, supra note 82, at 30506; Cohen, supranote 292, at 23.
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listening and inquiring in a sincere
effort to understand.32 °
9. Reflection

Participants are willing and able to
express and jointly reflect upon the
needs, attitudes and assumptions
that underlie their own and others'
ideals, interests, and preferences.3 21

10. Openness to Influence

Participants attempt to suspend
attachments
to
pre-existing
positions and established norms at
least enough to remain open to
others'
perspectives
and
proposals.32 2

Needless to say, complete fidelity to these deliberative principles will
be difficult or impossible to achieve, both for neutrals and for those
well-intended participants who strive to maintain the proper disposition
throughout the settlement process.32 3 The closer the ideal they represent
is approximated, however, the more integrity the outcome of a
deliberative settlement process is likely to have from a moral
perspective.324 The principles can operate as regulative ideals that
practitioners and parties attempt to approach without expecting to fully
realize them. Indeed, some dispute resolution theorists and practitioners
are consciously employing some or all of these principles in the design,
administration, and evaluation of dispute resolution processes. 325 Of
320. Minimizing strategic behavior is inherent in the notion of mutual respect and creation of a
forum where participants are free from coercion. I thank Herbert Kelman for the expression
"speaking to be understood and listening to understand" (personal communication with author).
321. See HABERMAS, supra note 82, at 306; Cohen, supra note 292, at 23.
322. See Cohen, supra note 292, at 22.
323. If those engaged in deliberation employ a facilitator, it also is needless to say that the
facilitator's training, skill, experience, rational and affective capabilities, biases, and general level of
maturity will affect the process for good or ill, influencing the extent to which the principles are
realized.
324. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 17 ("Deliberative democracy does not
assume that the results of all actual deliberations are just. In fact, most of the time democracies fall
far short of meeting the conditions that deliberative democracy prescribes. But we can say that the
more nearly the conditions are satisfied, the more nearly justifiable the results are likely to be.").
325. See, e.g., JOHN FORESTER, THE DELIBERATIVE PRACTITIONER: ENCOURAGING

Settling Significant Cases
course, some dispute resolution practitioners undoubtedly utilize process
designs and norms that satisfy some or all of the principles of
deliberation without conscious appropriation of deliberative democratic
theory.
Some principles of deliberation will be harder to remain faithful to
than others in the context of settlement discussions among parties to a
significant case. The principle of inclusiveness will be difficult to honor
in many two-party disputes-particularly those among private parties,
but even in those where the public is nominally represented through a
government official or agency-unless the parties are willing to include
representatives of other stakeholders, and other members of their social
groups who hold different views, in the process (or unless litigation is
pending and others have standing to intervene). The principle of
publicity potentially is compromised if parties want the process to
remain private, though the principle should acknowledge exceptions
where secrecy is necessary to protect the security of the participants or
the sustainability of the process.326 The less the outcome of the process
will affect non-participants, however, the less concerned we should be
about lack of inclusiveness and the secrecy of the process (as opposed to
its outcome, which we should hope will be made public, so that it
influences others' perspectives and actions).

PARTICIPATORY

PLANNING

PROCESSES

(1999)

(applying

deliberative democratic

theory

to

participatory land use planning); Forester, Dealing,supra note 138, at 464-65 (discussing the ways
in which consensus-building processes that call on "deliberative abilities to listen, learn, and probe
both fact and value together" can help produce agreement despite deep value differences); Judith E.
Innes, Evaluating Consensus Building, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 631, 647-55 (Lawerence Susskind et al. eds.,
1999) (including Habermas' ideal speech conditions among criteria for effective consensus building
processes); Menkel-Meadow, PursuingPeace,supra note 10, at 1771 (linking Habermas' theory of
discourse ethics and concepts of deliberative democracy to the development of new processes "to
respond to a host of legal and political conflicts"); see generally JOHN FORESTER, THE
DELIBERATIVE PRACTITIONER: ENCOURAGING PARTICIPATORY PLANNING PROCESSES (1999)
(applying deliberative democratic theory to participatory land use planning).
326. Gutmann and Thompson recognize that it sometimes may be appropriate for deliberation to
occur secretly so that participants can "speak candidly, change their positions, and accept
compromises without constantly worrying about what the public and the press might say."
GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 115. Conflict resolution practitioners who facilitate
dialogues among identity groups also recognize that secrecy may be necessary at some stages in the
process to safeguard the reputations, and even the physical well-being, of those courageous enough
to participate. See, e.g., Herbert C. Kelman, The Interactive Problem Solving Approach, in
MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 501, 507

(Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 1996) (discussing value of secrecy in dialogues among
representatives of groups engaged in conflict).
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VII. CONCLUSION
It is ironic that the courtroom is viewed by many disputants, lawyers,
and legal academics as the only acceptable forum for addressing disputes
involving deeply held values, because litigation, like negotiation, entails
compromise. Litigation involves compromise in at least two respects.
First, litigation is a lottery in which the substantive values a party seeks
to defend, and which it considers absolute, may be wholly or partially
discredited by the court. Second, litigation merely shifts the burden of
negotiation to others.
Negotiation should be viewed as a legitimate alternative to litigation
for processing and resolving disputes involving deep moral
disagreements. People accept the compromise inherent in adjudication of
ideological disputes because they value not only the substantive moral
perspectives they seek to defend, but also the pacific resolution of the
dispute itself. Settlements achieved through deliberative dispute
resolution processes may benefit both the parties and society in ways
that litigation cannot. From the public's perspective, deliberative dispute
resolution processes can multiply opportunities for democratic
participation and help citizens build social capacity to resolve tough
problems. Even where parties are incapable of engaging in genuine
moral deliberation, however, settlement for strategic reasons sometimes
may be a sensible alternative for parties to a significant case, and one
that should not invite scorn. Litigation and negotiation each have a
legitimate role to play in our nation's moral discourse and the evolution
of social norms. Litigation and negotiation are complementary, mutually
reinforcing social processes, even in the realm of disputes involving
deep moral disagreement. Settlement has an important and constructive
role to play in the pursuit of justice, the development of social norms,
and the strengthening of social bonds. Interactions between law and
social norms, and between the processes and institutions that produce
them, are complex and unpredictable. We should not assume that one
institution or process always is superior to others for righting wrongs or
producing social change.

